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1127 
SUPERVISION AND COLLABORATION 
REQUIREMENTS: THE VULNERABILITY OF 
NURSE PRACTITIONERS AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RETAIL HEALTH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Health care is expensive and scarce.
1
 These problems will only grow 
with the recent decline in the number of new physicians pursuing careers 
as general practitioners, leaving patients competing for fewer available 
appointment slots.
2
 Faced with reaching the capacity limits associated with 
the traditional physician-centric primary care model, focus is increasingly 
shifting toward improving efficiency in the delivery of care, thereby 
addressing both cost and access concerns.
3
 One of the most promising 
avenues for expanding the primary care capacity of the health care system 
 
 
 1. According to government data, health care spending in 2006 exceeded $2 trillion, an amount 
which triples the amount spent in 1990 ($714 billion). Jane An, Romy Saloner, Rebecca Tisdale & 
Usha Ranji, Kaiser Family Found. U.S. Health Care Costs: Background Brief, http://www.kaiseredu. 
org/topics_im.asp?imID=1&parentID=61&id=358#1b (last visited May 10, 2010). Health care 
spending is also growing faster than both inflation and the growth in national income and accounts for 
approximately 16% of U.S. Gross Domestic Product. Id. Out of each dollar of the total $1.6 trillion 
spent on health care in 2002, fifty-three cents was spent on hospital care and physician and clinical 
services. DANA P. GOLDMAN, ELIZABETH A. MCGLYNN & ABBY E. ALPERT, RAND CORP., U.S. 
HEALTH CARE: FACTS ABOUT COST, ACCESS, AND QUALITY 3, 6 (2005), http://www.rand.org/pubs/ 
corporate_pubs/2005/RAND_CP484.1.pdf. Furthermore, at least one study has shown that American 
adults receive only approximately half of the recommended medical services considered to be effective 
in the circumstances according to the literature and the medical community. GOLDMAN, MCGLYNN & 
ALPERT, supra, at 39.  
 2. According to data from the National Resident Matching Program, compiled by the American 
Academy of Family Practitioners (AAFP), 2654 residency positions in family practice were offered in 
2008, down from the 3262 offered in 1997. American Academy of Family Physician, Table 1—Family 
Medicine (2009), http://www.aafp.org/online/en/home/residents/match/table1.html. Despite this 
overall decline, it is worth noting that ―fill rates‖ (referring to the percentage of positions offered 
which were ultimately filled) for family practitioner residency slots have rebounded in recent years 
after reaching a modern low of just 76.2% in 2003. Id. There has been a similar decline in Internal 
Medicine—Primary Care residency positions, dropping from 608 positions in 1997, to 264 in 2008. 
American Academy of Family Physicians, Table 7—Internal Medicine (Primary Care) (2009), 
http://www.aafp.org/online/en/home/residents/match/table7.html. See also Elizabeth Harrison Hadley, 
Nurses and Prescriptive Authority: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 245, 261–62 
(1989) (citing the shortage of primary care physicians due to specialization trend, aging population, 
and the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid as driving an increase in the demand for health care 
services, which in turn increased demand for nurses). 
 3. See William M. Sage, Might the Fact that 90% of Americans Live Within 15 Miles of a Wal-
Mart Help Achieve Universal Health Care?, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 1233, 1235–38 (2007) (discussing 
how the health plan developed by President Clinton primarily focused on insurance and financing 
reform, whereas recently there has been a shift towards emphasis on health care delivery). 
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is to look beyond physicians to other categories of health care 
professionals in order to fill the primary care ranks—namely nurse 
practitioners (NPs).
4
 In addition to increasing the supply of available 
primary care, greater utilization of NPs as primary care providers would 
also achieve cost savings due to lower labor costs associated with 
nonphysician providers.
5
  
This is the foundational concept underlying the rapidly expanding 
―convenient care‖ industry: that with a willingness to depart from the 
traditional physician-centric primary care model, certain categories of care 
can be administered not only safely by NPs, but also conveniently and 
inexpensively.
6
 The focal point of the industry are what are known as 
―retail health clinics‖ (RHCs),7 which are small clinics offering a limited 
range of basic health services, usually located within large retail stores 
such as pharmacies and grocery stores.
8
 By staffing the clinics almost 
 
 
 4. Interestingly, many developing countries have turned to mid-level practitioners as a means of 
addressing significant physician shortages due to high emigration rates of physicians to developed 
nations, and thus are also faced with the accompanying licensing and scope of practice questions 
discussed here. See generally Jeffrey P. Lane, The Need for Effective Licensure Laws for Mid-Level 
Health Care Providers In Countries Facing Chronic Physician Shortages: A Case Study of the 
Marshall Islands’ Health Assistants, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL‘Y J. 767 (2008). 
 5. In 2007, the national average NP salary was $81,397. Jill Rollet & Sarah Lebo, 2007 Salary 
Survey Results: A Decade of Growth, ADVANCE FOR NURSE PRACTITIONERS, Jan. 10, 2008, 
http://nurse-practitioners.advanceweb.com/Editorial/Content/Editorial.aspx?CC=105177. In 2007, the 
mean annual income for a family practitioner was $161,200. American Academy of Family 
Physicians, Table 15—Median and Mean 2007 Individual Income Before Taxes of Family Physicians, 
July 2008, http://www.aafp.org/online/en/home/aboutus/specialty/facts/15.html. See also infra note 
183 (providing data regarding the cost of visits to different care settings). 
 6. See MARY KATE SCOTT, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., HEALTH CARE IN THE EXPRESS LANE: 
RETAIL CLINICS GO MAINSTREAM 6 (2007), http://www.chcf.org/documents/policy/ HealthCareInThe 
ExpressLaneRetailClinics2007.pdf [hereinafter EXPRESS LANE]; Sage, supra note 3, at 1241 
(discussing increased access due to lower prices). 
 7. A fundamental distinguishing characteristic of these clinics are expanded weekday hours. 
Target‘s clinics are generally open 9 a.m.–8 p.m. Monday through Friday. See Target: Locations, 
http://sites.target.com/site/en/spot/page.jsp?title=clinic_locations&state=MD (generalized from the 
hours posted for Target Clinics located in Maryland) (last visited May 10, 2010). Walgreen‘s 
TakeCare clinics are generally open 8 a.m.–7:30 p.m. on weekdays, see Find a Take Care Clinic—
Take Care Health Centers—Convenient, Affordable Health Care, http://www.takecarehealth.com/ 
clinic-locations.aspx?region=5 (last visited May 10, 2010) (generalized from the hours posted for 
Missouri locations), as well as weekend hours (typically 9 a.m.–4 p.m. or 4:30 p.m. both days). See 
also William M. Sage, The Wal-Martization of Health Care, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 503, 505 (2007).  
 8. The retail stores housing these clinics are known as ―host‖ stores. Jeffery Layne, Christopher 
N. Kanagawa & India K. Brim, Retail Health Clinics, in ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK 
FOR HEALTHCARE ENTITIES 417, 422 (Ellen L. Barton ed., 2009). Current host store chains include 
pharmacies such as Rite Aid, CVS, and Walgreens; grocery chains such as Kroger and Publix; and 
―big box‖ stores such as Target and Wal-Mart. See Convenient Care Association website, 
http://www.ccaclinics.org (last visited May 10, 2010), for a full list of member-run clinics. According 
to a report by the Convenient Care Association, a retail health trade group, the top ten treatments at 
Convenient Care Clinics (CCCs) or RHCs are (in order): sore throat, common colds/cold symptoms, 
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entirely with NPs, RHCs are able to provide wider access at a lower cost.
9
 
The potential for utilizing NPs in this independent manner is the 
culmination of a long, steady evolution of NPs from nurses with advanced 
training to professionals capable of independent practice.
10
 Despite the 
promise of innovative health care delivery structures possible with 
independent NP practice, some professionals claim that certain regulatory 
constraints on NPs in many states keep this potential from being fully 
realized.
11
 Web Golinkin, CEO of RediClinic, has been quoted as saying 
that ―[i]f clinics are going to realize their full potential to provide people 
with easier access to high-quality, routine health care at affordable and 
transparent prices, some of the regulatory barriers in some states will have 
to be torn down.‖12 
In addition to the education, accreditation, and licensing requirements 
faced by most professions, NPs are also subject to a host of additional 
state-imposed regulations and limitations,
13
 which, despite being framed as 
safety-based,
14
 have the effect of perpetuating the traditional dominance of 
physicians over all other health care professions.
15
 The most common 
 
 
flu symptoms, cough, sinus infection, allergies, immunizations, and blood pressure testing. Convenient 
Care Association, Fact Sheet: Convenient Care Clinics: Physician Oversight, http://www.ccaclinics. 
org/images/stories/downloads/factsheets/cca_factsheet_physician_oversight.pdf (last visited May 10, 
2010). 
 9. See Convenient Care Association, Fact Sheet: Convenient Care Clinics: Reducing Costs for 
Consumers and Third-Party Payers, http://www.ccaclinics.org/images/stories/downloads/factsheets/ 
cca_factsheet_affordable_care.pdf (last visited May 10, 2010) [hereinafter Convenient Care 
Association Fact Sheet] (reporting that the average cost of an emergency room visit as $445, of a 
physician visit as $283, and a visit to an RHC as $60). 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part II. For a full discussion of the legal risks involved in operating RHCs, see 
Layne et al., supra note 8, at 417. Among the regulatory issues potentially facing these clinics are the 
corporate practice of medicine laws, which are still in place in many states, federal and state anti-
kickback statutes, HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act), fee-splitting, and 
federal Stark laws (anti-self referral). Id. at 422–25. Perhaps sparking the most concern thus far is the 
potential for these clinics to violate Stark laws. Id. at 427–28. It may be possible to claim that one of 
the primary motives driving retailers to locate RHCs in their store is the potential for capturing the 
pharmacy business of patients who receive prescriptions from the RHC. Id. The thought is that if this 
is the goal, host retail stores will charge the RHC below market rent for the retail space, with some 
agreement or understanding that the RHC will then refer pharmacy patients to the store‘s pharmacy. 
Id. I could not find any report of this, even allegedly, actually occurring as of yet. Furthermore, 
discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 12. See EXPRESS LANE, supra note 6, at 12. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. Hadley, supra note 2, at 253 (stating that ―alleged purpose‖ of licensure laws ―is to assure a 
minimum quality of care for the consumer . . . .‖).  
 15. Peter J. Hammer, The Architecture of Health Care Markets: Economic Sociology and 
Antitrust Law, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL‘Y 227, 240 (2007) (―Historically, one cannot think about 
the architecture of American health care markets without acknowledging the physician‘s central 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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examples of these types of laws are physician supervision or collaboration 
requirements, corporate practice of medicine prohibitions, and restrictive 
scope of practice definitions.
16
 In states with supervision and collaboration 
requirements, an NP‘s authority to practice is conditioned upon some level 
of physician involvement—usually physician review of a proportion of the 
NP‘s charts, physician on-site time requirements, or mandatory 
collaboration between the NP and a physician in developing detailed care 
protocols.
17
 With the significant gains made by NPs in education, training, 
and qualifications, the necessity of these requirements in ensuring that NPs 
provide high quality care comes into question.
18
 In light of the reality of 
modern NP practice, the issue becomes whether these rules do more harm 
by impeding the evolution towards a more efficient delivery system 
(including the independent provision of care by NPs) while providing only 
nominal gains in quality (if any at all).
19
 
In particular, the persistence of supervision and collaboration 
requirements must be weighed against the costs of less vigorous 
competition.
20
 Independent NPs are generally able to provide basic clinical 
services
21
 at a lower cost than physicians,
22
 thereby imposing significant 
 
 
role.‖); see also infra note 33 (reciting a traditional definition of nursing which characterized nursing 
practice as being controlled and supervised by physicians).  
 16. See infra notes 44, 59–62. 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
 18. See Hadley, supra note 2, at 261–63 (reviewing the modern expansion of nursing practice 
and the accompanying intensification of training and education requirements); see also CAROLYN 
BUPPERT, NURSE PRACTITIONER‘S BUSINESS PRACTICE AND LEGAL GUIDE 47 (3d ed. 2008) 
(protocols intended to provide a ―guideline for a minimum level of safe practice‖). 
 19. See Linda H. Aiken & William M. Sage, Staffing National Health Care Reform: A Role for 
Advanced Practice Nurses, 26 AKRON L. REV. 187, 201 (1992) (―Supervision requirements were 
instituted based on the traditional role of nurses as complementary providers to physicians, but make 
less sense in the case of nurse practitioners . . . trained specifically to substitute for physicians in 
certain situations.‖). 
 20. The American Academy of Family Physicians took a slightly more ―middle of the road‖ 
approach in response to the explosion of RHCs, compared to other physicians groups. In 2006, the 
group issued a series of recommended guidelines for RHCs. See Press Release, American Academy of 
Family Physicians, America‘s Family Physicians Urge Retail Health Clinics To Put Patients‘ Health 
First (June 22, 2006), http://www.aafp.org/online/en/home/media/releases/2006/20060622retailhlth. 
html. At the same time, the AAFP promoted a new model of care for family physicians, known as 
―TransforMED‖ as a means of enhancing their members‘ ability to compete with RHCs. See id. The 
goal of TransforMED is to increase the availability of same-day service for patients through the 
concept of ―open access scheduling.‖ Id. The AAFP also encouraged physicians to offer expanded 
office hours. Id. 
 21. By basic clinical services I mean the everyday routine tasks, which are performed in almost 
all interactions with a health professional (such as taking a patient‘s history) as well as the commonly 
confronted ailments and repetitive services required by patients on a regular basis (e.g., suturing, 
ordering and interpreting simple diagnostic tests, and providing basic information on health 
maintenance).  
 22. Hadley, supra note 2, at 253. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/5
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economic pressures on general practitioners.
23
 Additionally, a stream of 
income for physicians who currently assume supervisory or collaborative 
roles relative to NPs would be eliminated since such roles generally 
receive compensation under the current system.
24
 
Although the medical establishment has long opposed NP 
independence,
25
 this opposition has further intensified with the advent of 
innovative, nonphysician based health care delivery structures such as 
RHCs, which increase the financial viability of NPs as low-cost 
competitors to physicians in certain categories of care.
26
 In response to this 
growth, a number of states have either already imposed, or are 
considering, legislation specifically regulating RHCs.
27
 One common 
thread to much of this legislation are provisions imposing more rigorous 
NP supervision requirements.
28
 Intensive collaboration and supervision 
requirements detract from the vitality of RHCs as a low-cost delivery 
method capable of increasing access to care by threatening RHC financial 
viability, because they constitute one of the risks that must be addressed in 
opening an RHC.
29
 These requirements add to the cost and complexity of 
operating RHCs, which are sensitive to cost changes such as these given 
the already complex environment in which they operate.
30
  
In this Note, I argue that states should eliminate mandatory physician 
supervision and collaboration requirements for NPs, as they can no longer 
 
 
 23. See Ann Ritter & Tine Hansen-Turton, The Primary Care Paradigm Shift: An Overview of 
the State-Level Legal Framework Governing Nurse Practitioner Practice, 20 HEALTH L. 21, 22 (2008) 
(―Financial self-interest and concerns about competition may play a role in physicians‘ opposition to 
increased clinical independence for nurse practitioners.‖); Hadley, supra note 2, at 253. 
 24. Although I was unable to find a precise salary or industry standard, one RHC company, 
MinuteClinic, advertises that it pays its Medical Directors ―hourly compensation‖ competitive with the 
local market of the clinic. See MinuteClinic, Physician Benefits, http://www.minuteclinic.com/careers/ 
physicians/whatweoffer/ (last visited May 10, 2010). 
 25. See Susan E. Baker, The Nurse Practitioner in Malpractice Actions: Standard of Care and 
Theory of Liability, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 325, 333–34 (1992) (quoting a representative of the AMA: 
―We do not believe in the concept of independent physician extenders. We believe they should be 
dependent and supervised . . . I believe that you maintain control by maintaining control of the 
money‖). 
 26. See Ritter & Hansen-Turton, supra note 23, at 22; see also infra notes 67, 70–72, 75 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of recent state-level legislative and judicial moves against NPs. 
 27. See infra notes 67, 70–72.  
 28. See infra notes 67, 70–72. 
 29. See also Layne et al., supra note 8, at 425–27. The impact of these laws is observable as 
RHCs ―have expanded most rapidly in states that allow broader scope of practice to non-physicians.‖ 
Sage, supra note 3, at 1238. 
 30. See Sage, supra note 7, at 518 (characterizing the risk that retail clinics will be unable to 
reach financially viable methods of pairing the needs of patients with the ―resources of appropriate 
health care providers‖ as ―substantial‖); see also EXPRESS LANE, supra note 6, at 21 (describing the 
economics of an RHC company as ―challenging‖). 
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be justified in light of the status of modern NP qualifications and practice, 
and may be used to stifle valuable innovation. In Part II, I review the 
history of the NP profession and the basic legal framework in which NPs 
practice. I also survey and scrutinize the ways in which these laws are 
being used to restrain the economic competitiveness of NPs. In Part III, I 
examine the ways in which supervision and collaboration mandates impact 
malpractice liability mechanisms and the consequences of these 
distortions. In Part III, I also analyze malpractice tort theories available 
under a regime of independent practice by NPs, arguing that these theories 
are sufficient to satisfy the goals of malpractice law. In Part IV, I discuss 
the policy implications of allowing these types of requirements to persist, 
with particular focus on the promise of market-based solutions centered on 
NPs to the access and cost problems plaguing the health care system. 
Finally, in Part V, I offer my brief conclusions on these issues, advocating 
full statutory independent practice for NPs. 
II. BACKGROUND 
NPs
31
 have been defined as ―registered nurses who are prepared, 
through advance education and clinical training, to provide a wide range of 
preventive and acute health care services to individuals of all ages.‖32 This 
is in contrast to the purely complementary role nurses have traditionally 
occupied in relation to primary care administered by physicians.
33
 
Connecticut was among the first states to pass a mandatory licensure law 
for nurses in 1939, defining the practice of nursing as the performance of 
certain acts ―under the direction of a licensed physician.‖34 In contrast, 
NPs are ―registered nurses who qualify,‖ and are licensed, ―for advanced 
nursing practice by receiving a postgraduate education.‖35 Since the 
profession was established, NPs have emerged and evolved into a 
 
 
 31. The term ―nurse practitioner‖ is sometimes used interchangeably with the term ―advanced-
practice nurse.‖ See BUPPERT, supra note 18, at 2. The term ―advanced practice nurse‖ is actually an 
umbrella term which covers a wide variety of nursing distinctions, namely NPs, clinical nurse 
specialists, nurse midwives, and nurse anesthetists (CRNAs). See id. at 3. 
 32. Id. at 1. 
 33. See Hadley, supra note 2, at 250 (describing nurses as complements to physician services 
under the first nurse licensure laws because they usually defined nursing as ―the performance of 
certain functions under the supervision of a physician‖).  
 34. Id. at 256. Connecticut passed its law in 1939, one year after New York. See id. 
 35. See Baker, supra note 25, at 325. For an example of a state‘s definition, see Siegel v. Husak, 
943 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (defining Florida‘s statutory equivalent of NPs as 
―registered nurses who have achieved further training and certification, after which they can perform 
additional supervised medical procedures and tasks that normally cannot be lawfully performed by 
other types of licensed nurses‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/5
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licensed, well-educated, rigorously trained category of health professionals 
with an expansive skill set, enabling them to function on a largely 
independent basis.
36
  
The NP concept gained traction in the late 1960s as part of a more 
general expansion of the nursing profession.
37
 The cornerstone of NPs, as 
distinct from the more common ―registered nurse,‖38 is that NPs are 
generally viewed as qualified to undertake more sophisticated and 
specialized acts than traditional registered nurses, much of that care 
requiring the exercise of independent clinical judgment.
39
 In general, the 
tasks commonly performed by NPs range from more traditional clinical 
activities, such as taking patient histories, providing immunizations, and 
ordering lab tests and interpreting their results, to more holistic forms of 
care including educating patients about illnesses and health risks, and 
assisting in the coordination of care.
40
 NPs offer an alternative source of 
more basic forms of care that patients previously sought from a 
 
 
 36. See BUPPERT, supra note 18, at 3. Forty-six states currently require NPs to be certified. 
Lyndia Flanagan, Nurse Practitioners: Growing Competition for Family Physicians?, FAM. PRAC. 
MGMT., Oct. 1998, available at http://www.aafp.org/fpm/981000fm/nurse.html. ―A state requirement 
that an NP be nationally certified leads to a requirement of master‘s education because the certifying 
agencies . . . require a master‘s degree to sit for the certification examination.‖ BUPPERT, supra note 
18, at 5; see also National Council of State Boards of Nursing, Boards of Nursing, https://www. 
ncsbn.org/boards.htm (last visited May 10, 2010) (―Each state or territory has a law called the Nurse 
Practice Act which is enforced by each nursing board. Nurses must comply with the law and related 
rules in order to maintain their licenses. The law describes . . . [q]ualifications for licensure . . . .‖). 
Carolyn Buppert provides the following list of the primary and typical functions of NPs: 
Obtaining medical histories and performing physical examinations[,] [d]iagnosing and 
treating health problems[,] [o]rdering and interpreting laboratory tests and X-rays[,] 
[p]rescribing medications and other treatments[,] [p]roviding prenatal care and family 
planning services[,] [p]roviding well-child care and immunizations[,] [p]roviding gynecologic 
examinations and Pap smears, providing education about health risks, illness prevention, and 
health maintenance[,] [c]ase management and coordination of care[.] 
BUPPERT, supra note 18, at 3. The first NP program was established at the University of Colorado in 
1965. See Baker, supra note 25, at 327. 
 37. See BUPPERT, supra note 18, at 6–7. 
 38. A registered nurse is ―a nurse who has graduated from an accredited nursing program, has 
passed the state examination for licensure, and has been registered and licensed to practice by a state 
authority.‖ STEDMAN‘S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (28th ed. 2006).  
 39. See BUPPERT, supra note 18, at 7 (first emerged when some states chose to expand their 
nurse practice acts scope of practice provision to ―allow diagnosis and treatment by nurses‖). Buppert 
states that as the concept of the NP evolved, it was intended that they make both nursing and medical 
diagnoses. Id. NPs are also becoming increasingly specialized in specific fields. According to the 
American Academy of Nurse Practitioners, NPs specialize in areas including family health, neonatal 
health, women‘s health, and mental health with many practicing in sub-specialties including 
pulmonology, dermatology, and emergency care. See American Association of Nurse Practitioners, 
FAQs about NPs, http://www.aanp.org/AANPCMS2/AboutAANP/About+NPs.htm (last visited May 
10, 2010). 
 40. See BUPPERT, supra note 18, at 4.  
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physician.
41
 As the range of care offered by NPs has expanded, NPs have 
become more controversial, as many general and family practitioners 
contend that these basic forms of primary care are essential to supporting 
their practices.
42
  
Today, a complex network of rules and regulations has developed from 
both governmental and nongovernmental sources, which frames the 
environment in which NPs practice. In Part A of this section, I survey the 
current legal framework in which NPs practice, with particular emphasis 
on physician supervision and collaboration regulatory regimes. In Part B, I 
identify and analyze recent state-level proposals to intensify existing 
physician supervision and collaboration requirements for NPs and the 
context in which these proposals are arising. 
A. Current Legal Framework 
The NP profession is rigorously regulated and monitored—both 
through governmental restrictions and statutes limiting scope of practice, 
creating education and accreditation requirements, and mandating 
licensure; there is also significant self-governing by the profession itself 
through private accrediting agencies and NP and nursing associations.
43
 
The primary source of rules governing NP practice are state Nurse Practice 
Acts and related regulations.
44
 Similar to statutes relating to other 
 
 
 41. See supra note 36 for a description of the types of care that NPs are generally considered 
qualified to provide. 
 42. See Rahul K. Parikh, Wal-Mart Can Be Good for Your Health, SALON, Feb. 19, 2008, 
http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/2008/02/19/retail_health_clinics/. 
 43. See infra notes 45–49. There are several organizations that accredit nursing education 
programs, including the National League for Nursing Accrediting Commission and the American 
Nurses Credentialing Center. Other organizations, including the American Nurses Association, the 
American Academy of Nurse Practitioners, and the American Association of Nurse Anesthetists, also 
offer certification programs for nurses.  
 44. BUPPERT, supra note 18, at 37–38, 51; see also Ritter & Hansen-Turton, supra note 23, at 23 
(―While some federal laws, such as those regarding Medicaid and Medicare providers, have an impact 
on nurse practitioner practice, all laws and regulations governing nurse practitioners‘ scope of practice, 
licensure, and physician collaboration requirements are created and enforced at the state level.‖). The 
efficiency of scope of practice laws has been a source of vigorous debate. See Alison M. Sulentic, 
Crossing Borders: The Licensure of Interstate Telemedicine Practitioners, 25 J. LEGIS. 1, 8 n.50 
(1999). Commentators looking specifically at nursing scope of practice statutes have been particularly 
critical of what they perceive as the vagueness of the definitions of permissible practice used in these 
statutes. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 25, at 339 (quote infra note 45); Janette A. Bertness, Rhode Island 
Nurse Practitioners: Are They Legally Practicing Medicine Without A License?, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS 
U. L. REV. 215, 255–59 (2009) (criticizing the vagueness of the Rhode Island NP scope of practice 
statute); BUPPERT, supra note 18, at 38 (―[A] vaguely worded nurse practice act that states, for 
example, that the scope of NP practice includes ‗acts of advanced nursing practice‘ will not provide 
sound legal basis for arguments that NPs should be admitted to managed care provider panels or get 
fees for providing physician services.‖); MINN. STAT. § 148.171(11) (2009) (defining nurse 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/5
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professions, these laws usually define the categories of nurses authorized 
to practice in the state and set forth basic conditions for obtaining a license 
to practice as an NP in the state—including education and accreditation 
requirements.
45
 Even in states not expressly stating specific education 
requirements, national accreditation organizations such as the American 
Nurses Credentialing Center, generally require individuals to hold a 
masters, post-masters, or doctorate from an approved nurse practitioner 
program in order to be eligible to sit for the national accreditation exam.
46
 
Finally, Nurse Practice Acts also define the legal contours and limits of 
practice for each category of nurse authorized under the statute—what is 
known as ―scope of practice.‖47  
These Acts typically authorize the state nursing board to establish rules 
regarding nursing practice, along with a corresponding power to take 
administrative action against noncompliant nurses.
48
 States vary as to 
which state entity has the power to impose regulations impacting NPs and 
their practice.
49
 The broad approach taken in defining authorized NP 
 
 
practitioner practice as ―within the context of collaborative management: (1) diagnosing, directly 
managing, and preventing acute and chronic illness and disease; and (2) promoting wellness, including 
providing nonpharmacologic treatment‖). 
 45. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2835.5(d)(2)–(3) (West 2003) (requiring that NP hold a 
master‘s degree in nursing or other clinical field related to nursing, and must complete an approved NP 
program); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4723.42(B)(2) (West 2004) (condition of license renewal that NP 
provide documentation of continued certification ―in the nursing specialty with a national certifying 
organization‖). 
 46. See American Nurses Credentialing Center, Family Nurse Practitioner Certification 
Eligibility Criteria, http://www.nursecredentialing.org/Eligibility/FamilyNPEligibility.aspx (last 
visited May 10, 2010). 
 47. Baker, supra note 25, at 338. 
 48. Id. at 338–39. 
 49. See BUPPERT, supra note 18, at 126–28. In some states, the Board of Nursing has the 
exclusive authority to impose regulations for NPs; while in others, the authority rests in a joint board 
of nurses and physicians. Id. For an example of a state which delegates exclusive authority to the board 
of nursing, see OR. REV. STAT. § 678.140 (2008) (detailing the composition of the nine-member 
board—five registered nurses, two licensed practical nurses, and two members of the public), and OR. 
REV. STAT. § 678.380 (2008) (delegating to the Oregon State Board of Nursing the authority to ―adopt 
rules applicable to‖ NPs, which establish certification requirements, limit or restrict practice, define 
scope of practice, etc.). For an example of a state creating joint boards of physicians and nurses in 
which this authority is vested, see MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 8-205(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2009) 
(granting authority to the Board of Nursing ―[t]o adopt rules and regulations for the performance of 
delegated medical functions which are recognized jointly by the State Board of Physicians and the 
State Board of Nursing‖); and MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-306(d)(1) (LexisNexis 2009) (―If 
a duty that is to be delegated under this section is a part of the practice of a health occupation that is 
regulated under this article by another board, any rule or regulation concerning that duty shall be 
adopted jointly by the Board of Physicians and the board that regulates the other health occupation.‖). 
 Still others give primary authority to the Board of Nursing but also provide the state medical 
board with a limited ability to create regulations which have a direct impact on NPs. Georgia is a 
prime example of this. See GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-26.1 (2009) (granting authority and enforcement 
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practice is a double-edged sword—it allows flexibility and expansion as 
NPs become qualified to take on additional activities, but makes such an 
expansion a risk for NPs (and their employers or supervising physicians), 
since the statutes fail to expressly authorize particular types of care.
50
 In 
the event that NPs are deemed to have overstepped the bounds of 
authorized practice, they are subject to sanction by professional 
disciplinary boards, and may even face revocation of their licenses.
51
 NPs 
may also be subject to sanction by state medical boards for exceeding their 
scope of practice if such activity is viewed as crossing the line into 
―practicing medicine,‖ which is typically prohibited by any individual or 
other professional not possessing a license to practice medicine in the 
state.
52
 Although not providing for compensation of injured victims, 
licensure-based sanctions are prophylactic in a way because injury to a 
patient need not be shown, and therefore may catch risky conduct before it 
results in actual injury.
53
 While licensure-based discipline is commonly 
available for licensed professions, NPs also face categories of regulation 
 
 
power to the State Board of Medical Examiners to promulgate rules regarding the delegation of 
activities to nurses, physician assistants, and NPs). 
 50. See Ritter & Hansen-Turton, supra note 23, at 23–24 (―This typically expansive definition of 
nurse practitioner scope of practice allows nurse practitioners to provide comprehensive primary care 
to a wide range of patients that ‗can both substitute for and complement the care of physicians.‘‖) 
(citation omitted). But see Baker, supra note 25, at 339 (―Failure to define the boundaries of practice 
may restrict instead of expand the scope of practice by causing hesitancy among NPs to expand their 
role for fear of malpractice actions or actions from the physician community charging them with 
practicing medicine.‖). 
 51. At least one commentator has criticized the fact that licensing boards are not required to have 
an empirical basis for limiting the practice of one category of professional compared to another, 
advocating that such limits should be based on comparative empirical risk assessment. See BARRY R. 
FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST & ROBERT L. 
SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW 73 (2d ed. 2000) (citing Sandra H. Johnson, Regulatory Theory and 
Prospective Risk Assessment in the Limitation of Scope of Practice, 4 J. LEGal MED. 447, 447 (1983)). 
 52. See Yancy v. United Surgical Partners Int‘l, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 185, 191 (Tex. App. 2005) 
(―[A]s a matter of statutory regulation, nurses are prohibited from making any type of medical 
diagnosis.‖). This is a major source of potential liability due to the broad definition of ―practicing 
medicine‖ that many states employ. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-3-102(8) (2009) (defining the 
practice of medicine as ―the diagnosis, treatment, or correction of or the attempt to or the holding of 
oneself out as being able to diagnose, treat, or correct human conditions, ailments, diseases, injuries, or 
infirmities, whether physical or mental, by any means, methods, devices or instrumentalities‖). In 
response, some states specifically exempt nurses rendering services in lawful discharge of their duties 
from coverage by their Medical Practice Acts to ameliorate the possibility of overlap. See, e.g., MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 37-3-103(1)(i); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-18(c)(14) (West 2008). 
 53. FURROW ET AL., supra note 51, at 75 (―Although protection of the public health provides the 
rationale for licensure, disciplinary actions under the licensing statutes do not require that injury to any 
particular patients be proven.‖); see also Britt v. Dep‘t of Prof‘l Regulation, 492 So. 2d 697, 698 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
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that apply exclusively to NPs—namely those that require and define the 
relationship between a physician and an NP.
54
 
Although not all states impose them,
55
 physician supervision and 
collaboration requirements are perhaps the most distinctive forms of 
regulation governing NPs in many states. Compared to the relatively 
standard nature of NP scope of practice statutes from state to state, 
collaboration and supervision statutory schemes are notorious for varying 
widely.
56
 The traditional formulation consists of a requirement that an NP 
work in conjunction with a physician to develop a written protocol under 
which the NP practices.
57
 Additionally, there are two primary types of 
mechanisms used most often in supervision and collaboration schemes: 
on-site time requirements and chart-review requirements.
58
 On-site 
provisions require that a supervising or collaborating physician spend 
some minimum amount of time at the location at which the NP practices, 
on some regular basis.
59
 As you might expect, chart-review provisions 
require a supervising or collaborating physician to review a certain portion 
of the NPs patient charts on a regular basis.
60
 A number of states requiring 
 
 
 54. See infra notes 59–62, 64.  
 55. Eight states currently do not mandate any physician involvement in NP Practice: Alaska, 
Idaho, Maine, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. BUPPERT, supra note 
18, at 46. Michigan also does not mandate physician involvement, though it is arguably distinctive 
from the others since there is no statute currently on the books regarding scope of practice. Id. 
 56. Ritter & Hansen-Turton, supra note 23, at 24 (―Legal requirements regarding the relationship 
between nurse practitioners and physicians lack standardization.‖). It is also worth noting that what 
constitutes ―supervision‖ in one state may be more akin to ―collaboration‖ in another state. Id.; see 
also infra notes 59–62 and accompanying discussion. 
 57. Id. at 24. 
 58. Baker, supra note 25, at 24. 
 59. Seven states currently have on-site supervision requirements. Ritter & Hansen-Turton, supra 
note 23, at 25 Tbl. 1; see ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 610-X-5-.08(4) (2007) (physician must be present for 
at least 10% of NP‘s scheduled hours); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 68, § 1305.35(a)(2) (2007) (physician 
must be present onsite at least once a month) (there is a proposed repealer being considered currently); 
MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 2150-5.100(4)(B) to (C) (2009) (NP must practice at least once every 
two weeks at the same site as physician prior to practicing at a location apart from collaborating 
physician); S.D. ADMIN. R. 20:62:03:01 (2007) (direct personal contact no less than half a day a week 
or one hour per ten hours of practice); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0880-6-.02(9) (2007) (physician must 
visit remote site once every thirty days); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 157.0541(c)(1) (Vernon 2004) 
(physician must be on-site at least 20% of the time). 
 60. Five states currently impose chart review requirements. Ritter & Hansen-Turton, supra note 
23, at 25 Tbl. 2; see ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 610-X-5-.08(9)(g) (2007) (physician must review no less 
than 10% of medical records plus all adverse outcomes); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 360-32-.02(7)(b)-(c) 
(2007) (must review and sign 100% of records with adverse outcome within thirty days and 10% of all 
other records at least annually); MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.159.1466(2)(a) (2006) (requiring NP to have a 
quality assurance method involving review of fifteen charts or 5% of all charts that the NP reviewed 
quarterly); TENN. COMP. R & REGS. 0880-6-.02(8) (2007) (must review at least 20% of charts every 
thirty days); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 157.0541(c)(2) (Vernon 2004) (physician must review at least 
10% of charts). 
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a physician‘s supervision or collaboration also mandate that the physician 
practice within a certain maximum geographic distance of the NP‘s 
practice location.
61
 Many states also impose ―maximum oversight ratios‖ 
that prohibit physicians from collaborating with or supervising more than 
a certain number of NPs at one time.
62
 
Physician supervision and collaboration requirements carry significant 
implications for NP practice. Under physician supervision and 
collaboration regimes, physicians are placed in a position to effectively 
exercise control over both the scope of practice of NPs and the financial 
viability of the NP‘s practice.63 Pursuant to these requirements, an NP is 
only allowed to provide those forms of care which the physician consents 
to include in the requisite written protocol guiding the NP‘s practice.64 By 
requiring an NP to seek the approval and consent of a physician prior to 
providing a new type of care, or in any other way departing from the 
previously established written protocol, NPs are rendered dependent and 
subordinate to physicians.
65
 Additionally, maintenance of a supervisory or 
collaborative relationship with a physician can add significantly to the 
labor costs associated with NP practice.
66
 States with maximum NP-to-
 
 
 61. See, e.g., MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 2150-5.100(2)(B) (2009) (NP must generally 
practice within thirty miles of collaborating physician, fifty miles if the NP is practicing in a federally 
designated shortage area); 18 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 90-40-100(B) (2008) (NP may not practice in 
separate setting from physician). 
 62. 18 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 90-40-100(A) (2008) (physician may supervise no more than four 
NPs at any given time). Texas has one of the most stringent statutory schemes governing NP 
practice—incorporating physician on-site and availability requirements, collaboration provisions, and 
maximum supervision ratios. TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 157.0541 (Vernon 2004) (required level of 
supervision includes developing a protocol, working onsite with the APN 20% of the time, reviewing 
at least 10% of the APN‘s charts, and being available via direct telecommunication for consultation, 
referral, or emergency; physician may not delegate to or supervise more than three Pas or APNs, or 
their full-time equivalents). 
 63. See Barbara J. Safriet, Health Care Dollars and Regulatory Sense: The Role of Advanced 
Practice Nursing, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 417, 452 (1992) (―An MD‘s decision to enter into a 
direction/supervision agreement with an APN is governed by no identifiable objective standards and 
limited by no procedural guarantees. Thus, the APN‘s ability to practice under her license . . . turns 
ultimately upon one private individual‘s ‗willingness.‘‖). 
 64. Id.; see also, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 64B9-4.010(1) (2009) (―An Advanced 
Registered Nurse Practitioner shall only perform medical acts of diagnosis, treatment, and operation 
pursuant to a protocol between the ARNP and a Florida-licensed medical doctor, osteopathic 
physician, or dentist.‖); FLA. STAT. § 464.012(3) (2007) (―An advanced registered nurse practitioner 
shall perform those functions authorized in this section within the framework of an established 
protocol that is filed with the board . . . within 30 days after entering into a supervisory relationship 
with a physician . . . .‖).  
 65. Barbara Safriet has argued that these regulations essentially ―mandate a life-long 
apprenticeship‖ because ―no matter how skilled and experienced the APN, or how utterly 
inexperienced the MD, physician oversight is a statutorily imposed condition of competence for APN 
practice.‖ Safriet, supra note 63, at 452.  
 66. Although compensation schemes vary widely, it is standard industry practice for physicians 
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physician oversight ratios magnify this additional cost since any clinic 
employing greater than the threshold number of NPs would need to hire 
multiple physicians to oversee the NPs in that one clinic.
67
 Because of the 
significant cost implications associated with supervision and collaboration 
requirements, such requirements leave NPs vulnerable to manipulations of 
the economic viability of their profession.
68
 A compelling indicator of the 
significance of these laws is the prevalence of recent proposals to intensify 
these requirements in response to the burgeoning popularity of RHCs and 
their utilization of NPs as the primary providers of care in RHCs.
69
  
B. Recent State-Level Attacks on NPs in Response to RHCs 
Recent state-level attacks on NPs provide stark evidence of the current 
vulnerability of the NP profession. Coinciding with the rapid expansion of 
RHCs across the country, a number of states have taken up legislative 
proposals to regulate RHCs and the NPs who staff them.
70
 These proposals 
 
 
to receive payment in some form for filling this role. See Carolyn Zaumeyer, Finding a Physician 
Collaborator, ADVANCE FOR NURSE PRACTITIONERS, http://nurse-practitioners.advanceweb.com/ 
Editorial/Content/Editorial.aspx?CC=35707 (last visited May 10, 2010) (―Some NPs pay their 
collaborating physicians a flat monthly fee. Others base their payment on the number of charts 
reviewed. Some even base their payments on a percentage of their revenue.‖). 
 67. See Letter from Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Dir., Office of Policy Planning, Fed. Trade Comm‘n, 
to the Hon. Elaine Nekritz, Ill. State Rep., 7 (May 29, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/ 
2008/06/V0800113letter.pdf [hereinafter Ohlhausen Letter] (stating ―such special requirements could 
potentially restrict competition, as they might tend to suppress supply or raise prices without 
conveying countervailing benefits,‖ referring to a proposal to implement a two-clinic limit on medical 
directors, likening it to a limit on the number of NPs a physician could collaborate with); see also 
supra note 24 (RHC compensation to medical directors). 
 68. This control could be said to exist on two levels: (1) through practically requiring payments 
to the supervising or collaborating physician, see MinuteClinic, supra note 24, Zaumeyer, supra note 
66; and (2) by effectively controlling the services an NP can offer to their patient-consumers through 
controlling the content of the supervision/collaboration protocol, see supra note 63 and accompanying 
text. 
 69. See infra Part II.B. These state-level proposals show the significance of these laws because 
they indicate that manipulation of these rules provide a ready tool by which the prospects of this 
promising innovation can be altered.  
 70. Richard Cauchi, Nat‘l Conference of State Legislatures, Retail Health Clinics: State 
Legislation and Laws, Nov. 2009, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13959. According to the 
National Conference of State Legislatures, other states which considered legislative action related to 
RHCs from 2007–08 include the following: FLA. STAT. § 456.041 (2007) (prohibiting physicians from 
supervising more than one office facility and supervising more than four PAs or NPs at any given 
time); H.B. 1484, 160th Session (N.H. 2008) (establishing a commission to study and develop 
legislation to regulate the operation of RHCs) (signed into law); S.B. 1256, 2007–2008 session (N.C. 
2007) (would provide for a legislative study of RHCs) (did not pass); S.B. 1523, 2008 session (Okla. 
2008) (proposing certain scope of practice limits and supervision of RHCs) (did not pass) and S.B. 
1638, 2008 session (Okla. 2008) (proposing ―supervision of non-physician practitioners in certain 
circumstances‖) (did not pass); H.B. 1096, 80th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2007) (relating to ―the delegation of 
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have taken a number of forms, both legislative and administrative, and 
have taken aim at several issues at the heart of NP practice.
71
 Many of 
these proposals include provisions to modify physician supervision and 
collaboration requirements, either for NPs in general, or specifically for 
NPs practicing in retail settings.
72
 While states undoubtedly possess the 
power to regulate NP practice,
73
 these proposals carry the specter of 
anticompetitive motives due to their potential impact on the RHC 
industry.
74
 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has expressed reservations 
towards special NP oversight rules for RHCs in response to Illinois House 
Bill 5372, which contained a provision stating that ―[a] physician may be a 
medical director of no more than 2‖ RHC facilities.75 The FTC posited that 
this ―two-clinic limit could be read to impose special supervisory 
requirements on licensed advanced practice nurses when those nurses 
provide limited health care services in a retail setting.‖76 The FTC went on 
to describe the basis for imposing ―special supervisory burdens‖ on RHCs 
as unclear since such burdens ―could potentially restrict competition, as 
 
 
certain medical acts by a physician to an advanced practice nurse or physician assistant‖) (did not 
pass). Id. 
 71. See generally Jennifer Ford, Annual Legislative Update, ADVANCE FOR NURSE 
PRACTITIONERS, Dec. 2008, http://nurse-practitioners.advanceweb.com/Editorial/Content/Editorial. 
aspx?CC=190736. For example, bills have been proposed in a number of states which call for 
removing recognition of the NP profession from under the umbrella of the Board of Nursing and 
transferring authority to the Board of Medicine. Id. There have also been recent attempts in Oklahoma 
and New Mexico to remove NPs from the authority of the state nursing board. Id. The Oklahoma bill, 
which failed, would have transferred authority over NPs from the board of nursing to the Board of 
Medical Licensure and Supervision. Id. The proposed bill in New Mexico would create a ―Super 
Board,‖ composed predominantly of physicians, ―to oversee any changes in scope of practice for all 
health care professions.‖ Id. Another target has been modifying administrative rules governing the 
permitted scope of NP practice. For instance, in West Virginia, the Board of Medicine is currently 
contemplating a rule change that would expand the definition of the practice of medicine to include 
even simple, minor treatments involving manipulation of skin below its outermost layer. Id. The text 
of the proposed rule is available on the West Virginia Board of Medicine‘s website at http://www. 
wvbom.wv.gov/prop_csr_11_10.asp (would include deep ablative, ablative, and non-ablative 
treatments and the alteration of the tissue by any mechanical means in the definition of the practice of 
medicine and surgery and would require delegation of the authority to perform such tasks by a 
supervising physician). Such a change could preclude NPs from activities such as stitching wounds—
activities that NPs have traditionally performed. Id. See also supra note 70 (statutes and proposed 
bills). 
 72. See supra note 70 (Florida and Oklahoma legislation); see also Ohlhausen, supra note 67. 
 73. See Ritter & Hansen-Turton, supra note 23, at 23. 
 74. See supra notes 12, 67; infra note 165. 
 75. Ohlhausen Letter, supra note 67, at 6. The bill also included a provision prohibiting an RHC 
from being located ―in any store or place that provides alcohol or tobacco products for sale to the 
public,‖ which drew significant criticism from the FTC. Id. at 10–11; see also H.B. 5372, 95th Gen. 
Assem. (Ill. 2008). 
 76. Ohlhausen Letter, supra note 67, at 6. 
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they might tend to suppress supply or raise prices without conveying 
countervailing benefits to Illinois health care consumers.‖77 While the FTC 
gave a less than enthusiastic response to enhanced supervision and 
collaboration requirements that only would apply to NPs practicing in 
RHCs, this does not address the possibility of legislation imposing 
increased oversight requirements on all NPs as a means of achieving the 
same ends. 
III. IMPACT OF SUPERVISION AND COLLABORATION REQUIREMENTS ON 
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY 
Supervision and collaboration requirements implicate a question that 
has long perplexed both courts and legislatures: when should one 
professional be held liable for the negligent actions of another 
professional?
78
 NP malpractice is governed under the laws of negligence,
79
 
where a victim must show that the defendant professional failed to act in a 
manner consistent with the professional standards of acceptable practice 
and that the failure to do so resulted in harm to the victim.
80
 Traditionally, 
courts applied theories of respondeat superior and vicarious liability to 
hold physicians liable.
81
 Through respondeat superior, an employer or 
principal may be held liable for the ―employee‘s or agent‘s wrongful acts 
 
 
 77. Id. at 7. 
 78. See, e.g., Southland Constr., Inc. v. Richeson Corp., 642 So. 2d 5, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1994) (in context of engineer liability, discussing Florida professional service corporation statute 
Sections 621.07 and 471.023(3), which states that an ―officer, agent, or employee of a corporation 
shall be personally liable and accountable‖ for both negligent acts committed by him, as well as such 
acts committed by ―any person under his direct supervision and control, while rendering professional 
services on behalf of the corporation‖); Parker v. Freilich, 803 A.2d 738, 748 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) 
(holding physician liable under theory of ostensible agency for negligence of doctor‘s independent 
contractor anesthetist); Prosise v. Foster, 544 S.E.2d 331, 332–34 (Va. 2001) (looking at liability of 
attending physician for negligence of medical resident under her supervision using theory of 
respondeat superior); Estep v. Hamilton, 201 P.3d 331, 337 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (claim alleged 
legal malpractice against attorney and vicarious liability of that attorney‘s law partners at the time 
under theory of apparent authority). 
 79. Baker, supra note 25, at 343. 
 80. Requirements for establishing medical malpractice claims are usually set forth in state 
statutes. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115 (2000). 
 81. Baker, supra note 25, at 344. General agency theory potentially applies to physicians because 
physicians who incorporate NPs into their practice could be said to be conducting their practice 
through the NPs, which is sufficient for agency liability under the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 7.05 (2006). 
 According to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006): ―An employer is subject to 
liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment.‖ It is 
also worth noting that respondeat superior liability and vicarious liability on the basis of agency are 
two separate doctrines. See Rogers v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 23, 28–29 (Mich. 2002) 
(Kelly, J., dissenting). 
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committed within the scope of the employment or agency.‖82 The 
applicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior turns on whether the 
person employing the employee or agent has the right to control the 
conduct of the employed person in the performance of the services.
83
 
These theories were well suited to traditional nursing practice where 
nurses are generally viewed as being entirely dependent on physicians in 
providing care.
84
 In such circumstances the control test was easily met.
85
 
As modern NPs increasingly engage in nonemployment relationships with 
physicians and practice in a more independent fashion, it becomes more 
difficult to establish the requisite level of control necessary to apply 
vicarious liability theories to hold physicians liable.
86
 This is further 
complicated by uncertainty as to the significance of supervision and 
collaboration requirements with regard to whether a physician had the 
right to control the actions of an NP under such an arrangement.
87
 
Courts look at many factors in determining whether the requisite right 
of control is present. Among the factors suggested by the Restatement 
(Third) of Agency are: (1) the ―extent of control‖ granted to the principal 
under the terms of the agreement; and (2) ―the skill required in the agent‘s 
occupation.‖88 There is support for the conclusion that the protocols 
required under supervision and collaboration regimes provide a sufficient 
 
 
 82. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th ed. 2004). 
 83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 cmt. d(2) (2006); see also, e.g., Kashishian v. 
Port, 481 N.W.2d 277, 280 (Wis. 1992) (―The right to control is the dominant test in determining 
whether an individual is a servant.‖) (citation omitted); Pamperin v. Trinity Mem‘l Hosp., 423 N.W.2d 
848, 852 (Wis. 1988) (hospital did not exercise right to control manner in which independent 
contractor radiologist provided professional services); Diggs v. Novant Health, Inc., 628 S.E.2d 851, 
857–58 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (hospital had no right to control manner or method of anesthesiology 
work at hospital by anesthesiologist and nurse). But cf. Berel v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 881 
S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. App. 1991) (fact that hospital employed a quality assurance person who reviewed 
charts to assure adequate patient care was sufficient to raise question of fact as to whether hospital 
exercised right to control physician). For a classic definition of the doctrine of respondeat superior, 
see Phila. & Reading R.R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U.S. 468, 486 (1852) (defining the rule of respondeat 
superior as being ―that the master shall be civilly liable for the tortious acts of his servant . . . whether 
the act be one of omission or commission, whether negligent, fraudulent, or deceitful‖).  
 84. William O. Morris, The Negligent Nurse-The Physician and the Hospital, 33 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 109, 122 (1981) (―A nurse, however, is not permitted to exercise broad judgment in diagnosing 
or treating symptoms that the patient may develop. The nurse‘s duty is to report such symptoms to the 
physician. Any treatment or medication must be prescribed by the physician. . . . By any standard, a 
nurse has a prima facie duty to follow instructions given by the treating physician.‖). 
 85. 61 AM. JUR. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 267 (2010) (―A doctor is 
vicariously liable for the negligence of nonemployee personnel only when those personnel are 
delegated to them by the doctor as his agent.‖). 
 86. Baker, supra note 25, at 346. 
 87. Carolyn Buppert, Implications for Collaborating Physicians, 3 J. NURSE PRAC. 306, 307 
(2007). 
 88. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f (2006). 
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basis from which to infer a right to control.
89
 Georgia, for example, defines 
the ―nurse protocol agreement‖ required under its laws as ―a written 
document mutually agreed upon and signed . . . by which document the 
physician delegates to that advanced practice registered nurse the authority 
to perform certain medical acts . . . which acts may include . . . the 
ordering of drugs, medical devices, medical treatments, [and] diagnostic 
studies . . . .‖90 Use of the very term ―delegate‖ implies that the physician 
is the ultimate gatekeeper of what is included in the agreement.
91
 
However, power over what care an NP may provide, although implying 
some level of control, does not necessarily imply control over the manner 
in which that care is provided.
92
 This is a potentially significant 
distinction.
93
  
In one recent case, a court in North Carolina declined to find that a 
hospital had the right to control an anesthesiologist since the hospital did 
not possess the ―‗right to control the manner or method‘ of the 
anesthesiology work performed . . . .‖94 However, this case is 
distinguishable from the NP-physician context. In Diggs v. Novant Health, 
Inc., by the terms of the agreement between the hospital and the 
anesthesiologist, the hospital only reserved the right to ensure physician 
compliance with hospital policies and the right to remove the physician 
from service.
95
 With NP protocol agreements, however, the control 
exercised is much more directly related to the nature of care provided by 
 
 
 89. See Buppert, supra note 87, at 308 (―[S]tate law requirements for collaboration generally 
state or imply some level of control or oversight.‖). 
 90. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-25(a)(10) (2009); see also supra note 64. 
 91. This inference is bolstered by Safriet who argues that under these statutory schemes, the state 
has delegated to the physician essentially total control over determining the ability of the NP to 
practice. Safriet, supra note 63, at 452.  
 92. The fact that courts have generally been careful to specifically emphasize the central 
importance of controlling the manner of work is telling because presumably all employers have the 
right to control what tasks an employee does in the course of their employment. See, e.g., Keitz v. 
Nat‘l Paving & Contracting Co., 134 A.2d 296, 301 (Md. 1957) (―The decisive test in determining 
whether the relation of master and servant exists is whether the employer has the right to control and 
direct the servant in the performance of his work and in the manner in which the work is to be done.‖) 
(emphasis in original).  
 93. The comments provided to the Restatement offer the following passage that, at least 
arguably, well-suits the case of NP supervision and collaboration:  
In some employment relationships, an employer‘s right of control may be attenuated. For 
example, senior corporate officers, like captains of ships, may exercise great discretion in 
operating the enterprises entrusted to them, just as skilled professionals exercise discretion in 
performing their work. Nonetheless, all employers retain a right of control, however 
infrequently exercised. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f (2006). 
 94. Diggs v. Novant Health, Inc., 628 S.E.2d 851, 858 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted). 
 95. Id.  
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the NP. Written protocols related to NP prescriptive authority are highly 
specific; one statute even sets forth the specific drugs which may be 
prescribed, the circumstances under which they may be prescribed, and the 
number of refills that may be ordered.
96
 Therefore the specificity of the 
protocols, as well as the fact that they bear directly on the nature of care 
provided by NPs, support the notion that a ―right to control‖ arises 
between the physician and the NP because both are suggestive of a greater 
degree of control held by the physician.
97
 
Many other relevant factors suggested by the Restatement, however, 
cut against a finding that supervising or collaborating physicians have the 
requisite ―right to control‖ NPs—namely, that NPs increasingly use 
separate practice settings and bill distinctly for their services.
98
 As NPs 
increasingly shift to providing care in settings other than doctor‘s offices, 
physicians are usually not providing the supplies and instrumentalities 
used by the NP in providing care, and NPs are billing separately for their 
services.
99
 Finally, for both practical and liability purposes, it seems 
unlikely that either the NP or the physician would characterize the 
relationship arising out of a collaboration agreement as master-servant.
100
  
One of the original motivations for using respondeat superior to reach 
physicians in the event of nursing malpractice was to ensure adequate 
compensation to the victim.
101
 In light of this motivation, the narrow 
circumstances under which supervision and collaboration arrangements 
may actually give rise to physician liability undermines the efficacy of 
 
 
 96. See, e.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGS. § 360-32-.02(5)(a)-(c) (2009). 
 97. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (2006) § 7.07(3)(a). 
 98. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f (2006) (stating that a factor to be 
considered is ―whether the agent or the principal supplies the tools and other instrumentalities required 
for the work and the place in which to perform it‖); see also Baker, supra note 23, at 328–29 
(discussing the fact that the federal government has authorized ―direct third party payment for NP 
services‖ and suggesting that private third party payors are likely to follow suit); supra note 50 (noting 
states that currently have no collaboration or supervision requirements for NPs).  
 99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (2006). The NP-collaborating physician 
relationship is somewhat unique compared to other traditional master-servant relationships where the 
relevant payment would be from the master to the servant. With this relationship, the NP (the potential 
servant) is compensating the physician (potential master) for their involvement instead of the other 
way around. Because physicians who are parties to these agreements are typically paid one-time 
consulting fees, this would also seem to cut against finding a right to control. 
 100. Although the third Restatement states that the label the parties give to a relationship is not 
dispositive as to whether an agency relationship exists, the second Restatement recognizing the parties‘ 
characterization of the agreement as a factor in determining whether an agency relationship arose. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.02; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(i) (1958). 
 101. See 27 AM. JUR. 2D Employment Relationship § 374 (2004) (stating that one purpose of 
respondeat superior liability is ―to give greater assurance of compensation for the victim‖); see also 
W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS 6 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1994). 
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these requirements in furthering that end.
102
 Furthermore, to the extent 
supervisory and collaborative relationships currently give rise to a duty 
owed by the physician to the patient, these laws facilitate inefficient 
liability shifting by imposing liability on less culpable actors—here, 
physicians who were likely not directly involved in providing care to the 
particular patient.
103
 When supervising or collaborative physicians bear a 
portion of the malpractice liability arising from NP practice, the deterrent 
effect of malpractice liability on NPs is weakened.
104
 One potential 
 
 
 102. Buppert suggests that if the physician merely ―sponsors or supervises a mid-level provider,‖ 
they face only ―minor liability exposure‖ for the acts of the supervised provider. Buppert, supra note 
87, at 306. If this is the case, then continuing to require this relationship is at best only playing a 
minimal role in assuring sufficient compensation. Compare Morvillo v. Shenandoah Mem‘l Hosp., No. 
5:07CV00046, 2008 WL 4179264, at *6, *8 (W.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2008) (holding 18 Va. Admin. Code 
§ 90-30-120, requiring CRNAs to work under the direction and supervision of a licensed physician, 
did not, by itself, create a relationship between the supervising anesthesiologist and the patient giving 
rise to a duty of care; the case instead turned on a determination of the applicability of respondeat 
superior between the CRNA and the anesthesiologist and thus, whether that relationship was that of 
master-servant), with Ware v. Timmons, 954 So. 2d 545, 554 (Ala. 2006) (hospital procedure manual 
and state statute requiring that CRNAs be under the direction of a physician when providing anesthesia 
care was sufficient to establish a reserved right of control, but this factor alone was insufficient to 
support vicarious liability absent evidence of a right of selection since CRNA and supervising 
anesthesiologist were co-employees). Texas has attempted to legislate clarity into this issue. See TEX. 
OCC. CODE ANN. § 157.001(b) (Vernon 2004) (―The delegating physician remains responsible for the 
medical acts of the person performing the delegated medical acts.‖); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 157.060 
(Vernon 2004) (―Unless the physician has reason to believe the physician assistant or advanced 
practice nurse lacked the competency to perform the act, a physician is not liable for an act of a 
physician assistant or advanced practice nurse solely because the physician signed a standing medical 
order . . . .‖). 
 103. Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of 
Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 569 (1988)(―The ultimate 
efficiency or inefficiency of vicarious liability . . . depends, however, on its effect upon employees‘ 
incentives to avoid wrongful conduct.‖). 
[I]n short, doing all the things that constitute modern living–there must of necessity be losses, 
or injuries of many kinds sustained as a result of the activities of others. The purpose of the 
law of torts is to adjust these losses, and to afford compensation for injuries sustained by one 
person as the result of the conduct of another. 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 101, at 6, quoting Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE 
L.J. 238, 238 (1944). ―So far as there is one central idea, it would seem that it is that liability must be 
based upon conduct which is socially unreasonable.‖ KEETON ET AL., supra note 101, at 6. See also, 
e.g., Glanville Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort, in CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 137, 138 
(George W. Keeton & Georg Schwarzenberger eds., 1951), as summarized in MARK LUNNEY & KEN 
OLIPHANT, TORT LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 18–19 (3d ed. 2008) (proposing that there are four 
bases for actions in tort: appeasement, justice, deterrence, and compensation); Richard A. Posner, A 
Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33 (1972) (―[T]he dominant function of the fault system 
is to generate rules of liability that if followed will bring about, at least approximately, the efficient—
the cost-justified—level of accidents and safety.‖). 
 104. See, e.g., Safriet, supra note 63, at 478–86; Mary Beck, Improving America’s Health Care: 
Authorizing Independent Prescriptive Privileges for Advanced Practice Nurses, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 
951, 965 (1995) (―Health policy is disadvantaged when liability is shifted upon an MD, because the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1146 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:1127 
 
 
 
 
counterargument to this is that physicians would respond by only working 
with certain NPs, thereby making up for this incentive deficit by 
encouraging NPs to practice at the requisite caliber in order to maintain a 
relationship with their supervisory or collaborative physician. There is a 
monitoring problem, however, because the physician has only limited 
information about how an NP practices on a day-to-day basis.
105
 The 
physician is not involved in every case, and not every case of malpractice 
by an NP will be discovered and litigated.
106
 Because the physician is 
unlikely to have the information necessary to accurately assess the risk of 
an NP‘s malpractice, this feedback mechanism is unlikely to create 
incentives for quality to the same degree as imposing direct and sole 
malpractice liability on NPs for the care they render.
107
 
IV. PROPOSAL 
Physician supervision and collaboration requirements with respect to 
NPs should be eliminated. Proposals to increase practice independence for 
NPs are not new,
108
 and full statutory independence is merely the final step 
in the evolution of these proposals to keep pace with the development of 
the NP profession. There are at least three primary issues arising from 
physician supervision and collaboration requirements that justify their 
elimination. First, the NP profession has developed to such an extent that 
these requirements are no longer needed to achieve their original purpose, 
 
 
deterrence goal of malpractice is hindered where liability is shifted away from the wrongdoer and the 
incentive to avoid malpractice removed.‖). 
 105. This is a problem analogous to the foundational example in the law and economics literature 
addressing what is commonly known as the ―principal-agent problem.‖ See Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Principal and Agent, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS ONLINE (Steven N. Durlauf & 
Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2008), http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_ 
P000183&q=principal%20agent&topicid=&result_number=1. ―A principal-agent problem arises when 
there is imperfect information, either concerning what action the agent has undertaken or should 
undertake. In many situations, the actions of an individual are not easily observable.‖ Id.  
 106. Studies have shown that up to 98,000 patients die each year as a result of avoidable medical 
mistakes and that only approximately ―one in eight instances of medical malpractice result[s] in a 
claim.‖ Leo Boyle, The Truth About Medical Malpractice, TRIAL, Apr. 1, 2002, available at 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+truth+about+medical+malpractice-a086391224. 
 107. This is analogous to the principal-agent problem in that the system should provide NPs with 
the incentive to exercise that level of care which will maximize both their utility and the utility of their 
supervising/collaborating physicians (i.e., minimizing the risk and scale of their malpractice liability). 
See Stiglitz, supra note 104 (stating that in the principal-agent problem, the goal is to find the contract 
―which maximizes the expected utility of the principal, given that (a) the agent will undertake the 
action(s) which maximizes his expected utility, given the . . . scheme . . . .‖).  
 108. See generally Safriet, supra note 63 (advocating for independent prescriptive authority); 
Hadley, supra note 2 (advocating for independent prescriptive authority); supra note 55 (listing states 
which do not require physician involvement in NP practice). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/5
  
 
 
 
 
2010] VULNERABILITY OF NURSE PRACTITIONERS 1147 
 
 
 
 
which was to ensure the provision of quality care by NPs.
109
 The 
intraprofessional and administrative quality safeguard mechanisms already 
in place for NPs are sufficient to achieve the same levels of quality and 
would simplify the regulatory scheme.
110
 Second, mandatory physician 
supervision and collaboration schemes leave the question of liability of the 
supervising physician with regards to instances of mistakes and 
malpractice largely unanswered.
111
 The unsettled nature of this issue 
muddles malpractice issues and distorts NPs‘ incentives to deliver quality 
care.
112
 Finally, physician supervision and collaboration requirements 
leave the NP profession economically vulnerable to physicians—who have 
an economic conflict of interest since NPs are, at least partial, 
competitors.
113
 This final point carries broad implications for the potential 
success of innovative delivery structures that depend on mid-level 
practitioners, such as NPs, to achieve their goals of lower cost and 
increased access.
114
 While independent practice authority is not a new 
idea, the growing demands on the health care system and creative 
solutions—such as RHCs, which could be stifled—make this third point 
particularly timely.
115
 
 
 
 109. See supra notes 14 (quality assurance purpose of licensure laws), 36 (certification 
requirements), 39 (increasing specialization of NPs), 43 (accreditation), 98 (third party payor 
recognition), infra notes 127 (comparison of training requirements to MDs), 146 (carry independent 
malpractice insurance) and accompanying text.  
 110. See supra notes 43, 45–46, 49.  
 111. See supra notes 86–100 and accompanying text. 
 112. See supra notes 102–04.  
 113. See supra notes 41–42, infra note 142; see also Safriet, supra note 63, at 449 (asserting that 
competitive bias can arise ―when one profession is empowered to define the practice boundaries of 
other related professions, and the latter provide services still offered by the former‖). 
 114. See Sage, supra note 7, at 511, 514; Convenient Care Association Fact Sheet, supra note 9, at 
1 (attributing the ability of RHCs to provide less expensive care to the utilization of ―certified 
physician assistants or nurse practitioners rather than physicians . . .‖).  
 115. See supra notes 5–9. Also making this a particularly apt time to embrace an expanded role 
for NPs is the fact that President Obama has made health care reform a primary priority of his 
administration. In his discussions on the topic, President Obama has repeatedly discussed the need for 
reform as a means of ―bending the cost curve‖ down to address the ballooning costs of health care. 
Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks in Town Hall Meeting on Health Care at 
Southwest High School, Green Bay, Wisconsin (June 11, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-in-Town-Hall-Meeting-on-Health-Care-in-Green-Bay 
-Wisconsin/ (―If we can bend the curve, the cost-curve down so that health care inflation is no more 
than ordinary inflation . . . then we‘re going to be okay.‖); William Safire, Bending the Curve, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2009, § 6 (Magazine), at 14 (reporting that President Obama remarked that ―it‘s 
important for us to bend the cost curve, separate and apart from coverage issues, just because the 
system we have right now is unsustainable and hugely inefficient and uncompetitive‖) (emphasis in 
original). 
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A. Modern NP Profession 
Statutory independence for NPs would more accurately reflect the 
current status of the NP profession by recognizing the development of NPs 
into professionals trained and qualified to exercise independent clinical 
judgment.
116
 Since the profession was created in the 1970s, NPs have 
increasingly moved from the more dependent functioning characteristic of 
the traditional nursing model towards ―comprehensive assessment and 
independent decision making.‖117 Alongside this expansion of the scope of 
practice of NPs, the professional and statutory regulatory context in which 
NPs function has likewise evolved to accommodate the expanded role of 
NPs.
118
 The transition to eligibility of NPs for direct-third-party payment is 
perhaps among the most significant indicators of the increasing 
acknowledgement of NPs as independent practitioners.
119
 In light of the 
changed reality of modern NP practice, physician supervision and 
collaboration requirements are no longer necessary to ensure that NPs 
provide a high quality of care to their patients. 
To begin with, there is no evidence that NPs are generally inclined to 
provide care at lower levels of quality than physicians when performing 
acts and providing care within the general scope of their practice.
120
 
According to a study commissioned by Congress and conducted by the 
Office of Technology Assessment, studies comparing the care given by 
physicians and NPs ―find that the quality of care provided by NPs 
functioning within their areas of training and expertise tends to be as good 
or better than care provided by physicians.‖121 More recent studies have 
confirmed this, concluding that patient outcomes do not differ between 
care provided by NPs and care provided by physicians.
122
 The evidence 
further shows higher patient retention rates and patient satisfaction with 
the care provided at nurse-managed health centers compared to like 
providers.
123
 These studies, combined with the fact that supervision and 
 
 
 116. See Baker, supra note 25, at 341 
 117. Id.; see also Aiken & Sage, supra note 19, at 201. 
 118. See Hadley, supra note 2, at 248–50. 
 119. Baker, supra note 25, at 328–29. 
 120. In fact, the evidence seems to support the parity in terms of quality. See Sage, supra note 7, 
at 512. 
 121. Ritter & Hansen-Turton, supra note 23, at 22 (quoting U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. 
ASSESSMENT, NURSE PRACTITIONERS, PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, AND CERTIFIED NURSE-MIDWIVES: A 
POLICY ANALYSIS 19 (1986)).  
 122. Mary O. Mundinger et al., Primary Care Outcomes in Patients Treated by Nurse 
Practitioners or Physicians: A Randomized Trial, 283 JAMA 59, 66 (2000). 
 123. Tine Hansen-Turton, The Nurse-Managed Health Center Safety Net: A Policy Solution to 
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collaboration regimes have, at best, an indirect impact on the quality of 
care provided to individual NP patients,
124
 are strong evidence that NPs 
practicing independently are capable of providing care at high levels of 
quality.
125
 
Furthermore, the remaining safeguards and disciplinary mechanisms 
under an independent practice regime are sufficient to oversee the NP 
profession and address quality-of-care issues.
126
 Even absent physician 
supervision and collaboration, NPs face largely the same rigorous 
regulatory and administrative practice environment as physicians and other 
nonmedical professionals.
127
 Most states require NPs to meet education 
and training requirements, pass national certification examinations, and be 
approved under the state licensure process.
128
 NPs are likewise subject to 
disciplinary measures by the state board of licensure in the event they 
demonstrate a failure to meet the standards of the profession in the 
provision of patient care.
129
 Disciplinary mechanisms by licensing boards 
 
 
Reducing Health Disparities, 40 NURSING CLINICS N. AM. 729, 734–35 (2005). Although it is likely 
that much of the evidence examined in these studies were of NPs providing care under some sort of 
supervision or collaboration regime, these results are still a compelling indicator of the ability of NPs 
to provide high levels of care independently since even under such a regime the NP would still have 
been functioning largely independently. Therefore, the impact of the limited role of a supervising or 
collaborating physician on quality on a day-to-day basis would be indirect at best. See also supra notes 
59–62 and accompanying text. Where on-site supervision is required, it usually covers only a 
relatively small portion of the total practice time of the NP. See supra note 59. 
 124. This impact is indirect in the sense that protocols are usually relatively general in nature, and 
it is still the NP who assesses the patient and provides the care.  
 125. See supra note 125. 
 126. See supra notes 43, 45–46, 49.  
 127. The regulatory structure for physicians is largely analogous to that which governs NPs. ―To 
be licensed, physicians must graduate from an accredited medical school, successfully pass required 
licensing examinations, and complete one to seven years of graduate medical education in the form of 
an internship and residency.‖ Yuri N. Walker, Protecting the Public: The Impact of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act on Licensure Considerations Involving Mentally Impaired Medical and Legal 
Professionals, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 441, 444 (2004) (footnote omitted). Additionally, ―[e]very state . . . 
has a medical licensure board responsible for controlling entry into the medical profession by means of 
licensure and disciplining physicians who are incompetent or engage in unprofessional conduct.‖ Id. 
Likewise, NPs are generally required to attend an accredited masters-level program, pass licensing 
examinations, and are subject to examination and discipline by state nursing boards. See supra Part 
II.A; see also American Academy of Nurse Practitioners, Qualification of Candidates, https://www. 
aanpcertification.org/ptistore/control/certs/qualifications (last visited May 10, 2010) (requiring 
graduation from an approved masters, post-masters, or doctoral level nurse practitioner program to be 
eligible for certification). 
 128. See supra notes 35–36, 43–44.  
 129. MODEL NURSING PRACTICE ACT art. XI, § 1 (Nat‘l Council of State Bds. of Nursing 2009) 
(authorizing the board of nursing to refuse to issue or renew, limit or restrict, suspend, or revoke a 
license, impose civil penalties of up to $10,000 per violation and impose fines). Among the grounds 
for discipline cited in the Model Act are: ―failure to demonstrate the qualifications or satisfy the 
requirements for licensure,‖ engaging in unethical conduct including ―demonstrating a willful or 
careless disregard for the health or safety of a client,‖ and engaging in unsafe or unprofessional 
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are a particularly valuable quality safeguard as the disciplinary authority of 
these boards is often not conditioned on a demonstration that actual harm 
was inflicted due to the lack of care of the professional.
130
 Some states 
have also imposed rules mandating that certain entities report instances 
related to NP professional conduct and capacity.
131
 
Additionally, nongovernmental entities act as a check on the quality of 
NP care. In order for practicing NPs to retain certification, the American 
Academy of Nurse Practitioners requires members to re-certify every five 
years—a process which includes sitting for an examination, as well as 
completing a minimum of 1000 hours of clinical practice and seventy-five 
hours of continuing education in their area of specialization.
132
 Health care 
entities utilizing NPs also act as a safeguard against substandard NP 
practice.
133
 These entities will try to hire only well-qualified NPs to 
provide care and will generally take reasonable steps to monitor the 
quality of care offered by their providers.
134
 This is motivated both out of 
an economic concern to ensure the quality of the product they offer to 
patients, as well as a desire to avoid potential corporate liability in the 
event an NP provides negligent care while practicing at their facility.
135
  
 
 
practice including the failure ―to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety‖ or any ―departure 
from or failure to conform to nursing standards.‖ Id. § 2.  
 130. See, e.g., Lisa E. Bartra, Reconsidering the Regulation of Health Professionals in Kansas, 5 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 155, 161 (1996) (noting licensure provisions that also provide for the 
discipline of unqualified providers who cause a risk of harm). Furthermore, nowhere in the Model 
Nursing Practice Act‘s articulation of the grounds for board discipline is actual injury to a patient 
required. See MODEL NURSING PRACTICE ACT, supra. In fact, with regard to unethical conduct and 
―[c]onduct or any nursing practice that may create unnecessary danger to a client‘s life, health or 
safety,‖ the Model Nursing Practice Act specifically states that ―[a]ctual injury need not be 
established.‖ Id. § 2(e), (g)(5). 
 131. See, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/65-65 (West Supp. 2009) (requiring health care 
institutions, professional associations, professional liability insurers, state‘s attorneys, and state 
agencies to make such reports to the Board of Nursing). 
 132. American Academy of Nurse Practitioners, Qualifications: Recertification for Adult and 
Family Nurse Practitioners, http://www.aanpcertification.org/ptistore/control/recert/qualifications (last 
visited May 10, 2010). 
 133. See infra notes 151–58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the issue of corporate 
liability. 
 134. See Hadley, supra note 2, at 296 (discussing institutional safeguards ―such as hospital 
admitting privileges and internal committees monitoring the quality of care‖ as an additional safeguard 
against incompetent professionals). 
 135. Presumably these internal checks could take a form analogous to those already used by 
hospitals and other health care entities. Id.; see also supra notes 151–58. 
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B. Clarifying Malpractice Liability Rules and Incentives for Quality 
Under my proposed scheme of full statutory practice independence for 
NPs, a practicing NP would generally bear the full liability for instances of 
malpractice arising from care provided by that NP. In addition to 
sidestepping difficult right-to-control issues, eliminating this potential for 
liability shifting furthers efficiency by insuring that NPs face optimal 
incentives to provide high-quality care to their patients.
136
 
One counterargument is that independent NP practice could lead to 
instances where patients are injured when they fall through the cracks 
between the standard of care applicable to NPs and that which applies to 
physicians.
137
 Currently, NPs in most states are required to exercise that 
level of care which a reasonable NP would exercise under the 
circumstances while a physician must rise to the standard of a reasonable 
physician.
138
 The argument is that there will inevitably be instances where 
a patient has an issue or ailment that a physician would be expected to 
identify and address in order to fulfill the duty of care they owe their 
patients, while a failure to do so by an NP would not violate the NP 
standard of care.
139
 Thus, the patient in such a case would have a 
malpractice claim if the provider was a physician, but not if the provider 
was an NP. One potential answer to this criticism is the Doctrine of 
Delegated Acts, which assumes ―that acts characterized as medical retain 
that characterization for all time,‖ regardless of whether that act is 
subsequently delegated to mid-level practitioners.
140
 Application of this 
 
 
 136. See supra notes 102–04.  
 137. See Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Extending Physician’s Standard of Care to Non-
Physician Prescribers: The Rx for Protecting Patients, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 79 (1998) (―[D]ifferent 
standards of care might well be ‗disastrous‘ for the injured plaintiff who was doubly unlucky: first, he 
was the victim of malpractice; and second, the person who injured him was a non-physician provider 
with a lower standard of care.‖). But see Beck, supra note 104, at 965 (―The standard of care by which 
a court should measure advanced nursing practice should be that degree of skill and learning 
commonly exercised by a prudent and reasonable member of the APN profession.‖). 
 138. Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (―[O]ne who undertakes to 
render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge 
normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities.‖) 
(citation omitted); Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 674 (Cal. 1985) (―examination‖ and 
―diagnosis‖ are not, as a matter of law, functions reserved exclusively for physicians, and therefore the 
trial court erred in holding NP to physicians‘ standard of care); see also, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-
21.12 (2008) (must consider whether care was ―in accordance with the standards of practice among 
members of the same health care profession with similar training and experience‖); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 6-1012 (2004) (health care providers are to be judged against ―similarly trained and qualified 
providers of the same class . . . taking into account his or her training, experience, and fields of 
medical specialization . . .‖).  
 139. Coleman & Shellow, supra note 137, at 79.  
 140. Baker, supra note 25, at 342. The notion that some tasks are inherently medical has been 
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rule would essentially result in NPs being held to the physician duty of 
care in a great number of the professional tasks they perform, since 
physician practice arguably encompasses all that NPs are capable of 
performing.
141
 This would mean that theoretically no patients would fall 
through the cracks. 
Even if the different duties of care are applied to NPs, that fact alone is 
insufficient to justify dependent NP practice. It is not necessary to 
conclude that NPs and physicians are entirely equivalent in terms of 
education, training, qualifications, or clinical abilities in order to justify 
independent practice; only that NPs are capable of providing 
interchangeable levels of care within their permitted scope of practice.
142
 
Therefore, any concerns about patients falling through the cracks are more 
appropriately addressed in terms of NP scope of practice through Nurse 
Practice Acts and the duty of referral, and not through dependent practice. 
Finally, it is important to note that in many instances where patients visit 
NPs, they are not simply choosing between seeking care from a physician 
versus an NP; due to either cost or convenience considerations, or a 
combination of the two, many patients may be choosing between NP care 
or not seeking care at all.
143
 
Another possible criticism is that dependent practice is necessary to 
ensure that patients injured as a result of malpractice will be adequately 
compensated. This argument is largely predicated on the fact that 
traditionally, NPs have obtained malpractice insurance via the malpractice 
 
 
criticized, however. See Fein, 695 P.2d at 674 (rejecting jury instruction stating that NP‘s conduct in 
performing tasks delegated by supervising physician must be measured against standard of care of 
physician). 
 141. However, many courts have implicitly rejected the argument that NPs and physicians should 
be held to the same duty of care. See Baker, supra note 25, at 341 (discussing the overlap between 
tasks performed by NPs and those performed by physicians). See also, e.g., Simonson v. Keppard, 225 
S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (inappropriate to use neurosurgeon to provide expert testimony 
as to the standard of care for NPs because different standards of care apply to a diagnosis performed 
by NP versus a diagnosis by a physician); Land v. Barnes, No. M2008-00191-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 
4254155, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2008) (excluding testimony of both a physician and a 
physician assistant regarding applicable standard of care for nurse practitioners on grounds that both 
witnesses failed to establish that they were sufficiently familiar with the standard of care for NPs).  
 142. See Baker, supra note 25, at 341 (discussing the ―interprofessional intersection‖ between NPs 
and physicians, concluding that in areas where ―[t]he expanded role of the NP is coextensive . . . with 
the practice of medicine. . . . The medical services rendered . . . are essentially the same. The 
difference is the model of care delivery‖). 
 143. See Sage, supra note 7, at 514–15 (discussing fact that many RHC patrons are uninsured and 
arguing that because of the lower cost and enhanced convenience factors, the cost-benefit balancing 
performed by patients contemplating whether or not to seek certain basic forms of care is more likely 
to favor seeking care with RHCs than when physicians are the only potential option). 
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insurance policies of the physicians with whom they work.
144
 Thus, critics 
might argue that dependent practice is an important safeguard to make 
certain that NPs are adequately insured, thereby satisfying the 
compensation goal of malpractice tort liability.
145
 This concern is not 
compelling, however, in light of the fact that independent NP malpractice 
policies are currently available and are likely to become more standard for 
the profession with the implementation of independent practice.
146
 
Furthermore, as discussed previously, this issue is insufficient to justify 
dependent practice due to the uncertainty surrounding the issue of when a 
supervising or collaborating physician may be held liable for the NP‘s 
actions.
147
 At least one expert in the field, Carolyn Buppert, has concluded 
that a physician who does not employ, but supervises or collaborates with 
an NP faces only ―minor liability exposure.‖148 Therefore, at best, 
dependent practice offers a very narrow set of circumstances in which this 
additional pool of money would be available to compensate a malpractice 
victim. Concerns regarding the sufficiency of compensation for 
malpractice victims under an independent practice scheme are further 
alleviated by the continuing presence of hospitals, RHC companies, and 
other entities utilizing NPs. This effect is two-fold. First, when entities 
such as these engage NPs in the delivery of care, they ensure that those 
NPs are adequately insured—either by providing the insurance themselves 
or by requiring that the NP carry a certain level of insurance as a condition 
of providing care through the entity.
149
 Second, hospitals and other health 
 
 
 144. Before independent malpractice policies for NPs became available, NPs practicing in a 
physician practice generally relied on the insurance policy of the physician through the use of what is 
known as a ―rider,‖ which is merely an attachment or added provision to a policy that, in this context, 
modifies the policy so as to include the NP. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1347 (8th ed. 2004) (―An 
attachment to some document, such as a legislative bill or an insurance policy, that amends or 
supplements the document.‖).  
 145. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 146. Baker, supra note 25, at 344, 336 (asserting that ―[t]oday, NPs can and do carry their own 
malpractice liability insurance‖ and that ―[e]very professional has an obligation to carry sufficient 
malpractice coverage to ensure that a patient injured by malpractice will be justly compensated‖). A 
brief internet search turned up several companies that offer NP-specific malpractice policies, including 
companies such as Nurses Service Organization, Proliability/Marsh Inc., and CM&F Group Inc., to 
name a few.  
 147. See supra Part III. 
 148. See Buppert, supra note 87, at 306.  
 149. The rationale for these measures would be largely the same as those motivating institutional 
competency safeguards, except that maintaining adequate insurance does not directly help to avoid 
malpractice liability. See Hadley, supra note 2, at 296. Presumably such institutional safeguards are 
also, at least to some extent, intended to protect the reputation of the health care entity. There are three 
potential reasons why an entity employing NPs would do this: (1) For the business reason that patients 
are less likely to visit a clinic which is under-insured; (2) there are state requirements mandating some 
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care entities (such as RHCs) which choose to employ or otherwise utilize 
NPs may be liable under a theory of corporate negligence.
150
 Corporate 
liability is premised on the notion that entities such as hospitals owe 
certain duties directly to the patients who seek care from their 
institutions.
151
 Those duties include a duty to oversee those who provide 
care through the institution and a duty to develop adequate rules and 
enforcement mechanisms to ensure high-quality care.
152
 Thus, under a 
theory of corporate negligence, hospitals, and other health care entities 
may be held liable even if respondeat superior does not apply.
153
 
Imposition of this liability is justified, proponents argue, because hospitals 
are increasingly presenting themselves to the public as the source of health 
care, instead of the particular professionals who actually provide the care 
offered by the institutions.
154
 Furthermore, hospitals are arguably in the 
best position to monitor the quality of their staff and the quality of care.
155
 
Corporate liability would be limited to instances of negligent hiring and 
monitoring, on the part of the corporation or institution, of the quality and 
qualifications of NPs providing care on their behalf.
156
 The limited scope 
of corporate liability is appropriate in order to avoid the same 
 
 
minimum level of insurance; (3) concerned about liability exposure of the larger entity in the event of 
malpractice by the NP.  
 150. Corporate negligence has been described as ―a doctrine under which the hospital is liable if it 
fails to uphold the proper standard of care owed the patient‖ that ―creates a nondelegable duty which 
the hospital owes directly to a patient.‖ Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 1991). 
Thus, under corporate negligence, there would be no need to affirmatively establish that the NP was 
negligent in any way. Id. This is in sharp contrast to a claim based on a theory of respondeat superior, 
which requires such a finding as a threshold matter, since it is a form of vicarious liability. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006). 
 151. David H. Rutchik, Note, The Emerging Trend of Corporate Liability: Courts’ Uneven 
Treatment of Hospital Standards Leaves Hospitals Uncertain and Exposed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 535, 
536 (1994). 
 152. Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707. The case suggested that a hospital‘s duties could be broken into 
four categories:  
(1) a duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and 
equipment; (2) a duty to select and retain only competent physicians; (3) a duty to oversee all 
persons who practice medicine within its walls as to patient care; and (4) a duty to formulate, 
adopt and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for the patients.  
Id. (citations omitted). Presumably, this argument could be expanded to all categories of health care 
providers practicing at the hospital. 
 153. Rutchik, supra note 151, at 536. 
 154. See id. at 548 (explaining the corporate liability trend as growing from general public 
perception and reliance on hospitals as the healthcare provider instead of the particular physicians, 
nurses and other health care professionals). 
 155. Id. at 549. 
 156. This scheme would therefore be analogous to cases where hospitals are held liable for 
negligently granting privileges to unqualified physicians and surgeons. See, e.g., Strubhart v. Perry 
Mem‘l Hosp. Trust Auth., 903 P.2d 263 (Okla. 1995). 
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inefficiencies identified previously with regard to liability shifting to 
supervising physicians under a theory of respondeat superior.
157
 Thus, 
corporate negligence provides another layer of safeguards for quality NP 
practice, by encouraging hospitals to engage in careful hiring and 
administration. It is important to note, however, that this theory has not 
been universally accepted by courts.
158
 
Statutory independent practice for NPs has the potential to rationalize 
incentives for quality NP care without sacrificing malpractice victim 
compensation. Independent practice would simplify malpractice liability 
related to NP practice, thereby making the deterrent effect of malpractice 
liability more vigorous.
159
 At the same time, independent NP malpractice 
insurance, combined with the possibility of a distinct basis of liability for 
the entities contracting with and employing NPs, moots concerns 
regarding the sufficiency of compensation to malpractice victims. 
C. Statutory Independence Achieves Important Public Policy Objectives 
Independent NP practice is an essential element for granting NPs the 
professional recognition they have earned and furthering the goal of 
rationalizing the manner in which health care is delivered.
160
 In a system 
of fully independent practice by NPs, NPs would be encouraged to utilize 
the full range of their qualifications by exercising their independent 
clinical judgment, allowing greater flexibility to meet patient needs. 
Physician supervision and collaboration requirements have a ―corrosive 
effect on . . . [NPs‘] sense of professionalism‖ by requiring NPs to 
constantly seek physician approval of the manner in which they provide 
care.
161
 Elimination of these rules would also reduce the possibility that 
 
 
 157. See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text. 
 158. See, e.g., Gafner v. Down E. Cmty. Hosp., 735 A.2d 969 (Me. 1999) (rejecting corporate 
liability as a new cause of action which would have provided for direct liability against hospitals and 
medical facilities); Barkes v. River Park Hosp., Inc., No. M2006-01214-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 
5423981 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2008) (rejecting corporate negligence as a theory by which to 
impose liability on hospital due to breach of duty of care owed by the hospital directly to the patient). 
Additionally, for criticisms of the approach taken in Thompson v. Nason, 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991), see 
Judith M. Kinney, Casenote, Tort Law-Expansion of Hospital Liability Under the Doctrine of 
“Corporate Negligence,” 65 TEMP. L. REV. 787 (1992); Mark E. Milsop, Comment, Corporate 
Negligence: Defining the Duty Owed by Hospitals to Their Patients, 30 DUQ. L. REV. 639 (1992). 
Both authors are particularly critical of the court‘s failure to specify the content and nature of the duty 
owed by a hospital to its patients. Id. at 643; Kinney, supra, at 797. 
 159. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.  
 160. Safriet, supra note 63, at 452 (―At best, such schemes demean APNs‘ professional role and 
ability, and further retard their full utilization in our health care system.‖).  
 161. Id. at 451. 
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patients might misunderstand the physician‘s role and perceive the very 
existence of the requirements as evidence that NPs provide a lesser level 
of care or are in some way unqualified to provide care absent a physician‘s 
involvement.
162
 This is not to suggest that independent practice should 
signal to society that NPs are perfect substitutes for physician care in all 
circumstances, merely that there are circumstances in which an NP will be 
able to provide comparable levels of care as a physician.
163
 Therefore, this 
clarification could also have the effect of broadening public understanding 
of the capabilities of NPs, which would aid individuals in making more 
informed choices when deciding whether to visit an NP or a physician.
164
  
Doing away with mandatory physician involvement also dispenses with 
the possibility that physicians will exercise ―anti-competitive animus‖ 
towards NPs.
165
 As demonstrated by the recent string of state legislative 
attempts to intensify supervision and collaboration requirements in 
response to the competitive success of RHCs, these rules provide a ready 
means by which physicians can control the financial prospects of potential 
competitors.
166
 Safety- and quality-based criticisms of RHCs are 
suspicious, however, in light of the fact that the RHC concept relies on 
providing a very narrow range of care that is well within the confines of 
the scope of practice of NPs.
167
 If the care provided by NPs in RHCs is 
among the most basic forms of care offered by NPs outside the RHC 
setting, there appears to be little, if any, justification for increased 
supervision and collaboration requirements simply because an increasing 
number of NPs are practicing in retail settings.
168
  
In addition to the drawbacks in terms of the professional status of NPs, 
leaving open this avenue for physicians to stifle the NP profession 
threatens the viability of innovative delivery reforms such as RHCs.
169
 
Any viable attempt at meaningful reform of the health care system will 
 
 
 162. This is analogous to an argument made in support of NP prescriptive authority. Beck, supra 
note 104, at 960 (arguing that ―where the legal requirement for MD supervision exists . . . it suggests 
to the public that APNs lack knowledge to prescribe treatments for conditions they have diagnosed‖).  
 163. Hadley has suggested a reasonable and simple place to draw this line by using surgery as an 
example of the type of context in which ―nurses are inherently complementary,‖ but arguing that ―in 
the provision of primary care and in outpatient settings, nurses can function as substitutes for 
physicians.‖ Hadley, supra note 2, at 251. 
 164. See Kristin Madison, Regulating Health Care Quality in an Information Age, 40 U. C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1577 (2007). 
 165. Safriet, supra note 63, at 452. 
 166. See supra notes 63, 70–71. 
 167. See Ohlhausen Letter, supra note 67, at 7. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See EXPRESS LANE, supra note 6, at 12; Ohlhausen Letter, supra note 67 and accompanying 
text. 
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need to accept that health care is a limited resource, particularly care 
provided by the most highly trained professionals such as physicians.
170
 
Thus, the key becomes allocating this resource in a rational and efficient 
manner.
171
 RHCs constitute a promising step towards more efficient 
delivery of care, which could simultaneously address both cost and access 
problems currently plaguing the health care industry.
172
 The idea 
underlying RHCs is that NPs are a vital ingredient to finding the ―right‖ 
allocation of the ―right types of professionals‖ to provide the optimal level 
of care to the overall population.
173
 This idea is both promising and 
controversial for the same reason—it is a market-driven solution to a 
problem in the health care arena. Health care markets have long been 
viewed as unique and ill-suited to being left to normal market forces—a 
phenomenon which has been described as the ―central paradox of 
contemporary health care markets.‖174  
One of the most compelling arguments that can be made against 
market-based solutions to health care markets is that consumers generally 
lack the ability to adequately judge the quality of health care provided by a 
particular provider.
175
 Instead, society largely relies on scope of practice 
and licensing statutes to delineate between health care professionals based 
on which profession is qualified to perform particular categories of care.
176
 
Many commentators have criticized the tradition of physician dominance 
since other health professions have developed their education and skill set 
to the point where they are, as a matter of standard practice, delegated 
many medical acts.
177
 If other health care professionals are qualified and 
 
 
 170. See supra note 2. 
 171. Hammer, supra note 15, at 248 (―The critical organizational problem in health care is how to 
rationalize the utilization of care at the individual clinical setting in a manner that corresponds to 
collective needs and resource constraints.‖ (discussing NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF 
MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES (2001)). 
 172. See Sage, supra note 3, at 1238–43. 
 173. See Sage, supra note 7, at 518 (―If the potential benefits of innovative care delivery models, 
including but not limited to retail clinics, are to be realized, the United States needs to produce enough 
of the right types of professionals to promote public health and provide acute and chronic services 
. . . .‖). 
 174. Hammer, supra note 15, at 259 (describing this paradox as the fact that markets are better 
equipped to achieve efficiency in rationing care but lack legitimacy on the individual clinical 
encounter level, while physicians enjoy legitimacy in individual clinical encounters, but are ill 
equipped to deal with issues of efficiency). 
 175. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 164, at 1584 (―Without some form of outside assistance, 
uninformed patients cannot choose their providers based on quality, pay their providers based on 
quality, or meaningfully contract based on quality.‖). 
 176. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 177. Hammer, supra note 15, at 237 (―From a historical perspective, the story of American health 
care is a story of physician dominance.‖); id. at 258 (discussing two distinct mechanisms available to 
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proficient at performing certain categories of primary care, it would seem 
to follow that embracing such a division of labor would encourage a more 
efficient allocation of resources by leaving less complex health care 
services to less expensive, though qualified, professionals.
178
 Quality must 
mean more than using the most highly trained professionals to provide all 
care—sensible policy must also consider cost and access.179  
Recent scientific research confirms the potential of RHCs to expand 
patient access to basic forms of care and to provide that care at a lower 
cost than alternative sources. One study comparing patient visits to RHCs 
with patient visits to primary care physicians and emergency departments 
concluded that ―[r]etail clinics appear to be providing care to a patient 
population less likely to use PCPs [primary care physicians] . . . .‖180 The 
study found that only 67% of RHC visits were paid for by insurance, 
compared to 90% of physician visits.
181
 Because of the lower cost of care, 
RHCs are an attractive option for uninsured individuals who are bearing 
the full cost of any health care they seek.
182
 RHCs also contribute to cost 
savings on two levels. On the individual patient level, the average cost of 
an RHC visit is $60, compared to $283 for a physician visit.
183
 RHCs also 
 
 
rationalize costs: reliance on the market and reliance on a system of physician deference). For a 
discussion of implications of different standards of care, see supra notes 137–40 and accompanying 
text. Safriet has also been a staunch critic of relying on the traditional physician-centric delineation of 
the roles of all other health care practitioners, describing this structure as ―a historical, but not 
inevitable, phenomenon.‖ Safriet, supra note 63, at 442. Safriet posits that this structure developed 
largely because physicians were simply the first health professionals to gain legislative recognition and 
when this occurred, ―extremely broad‖ statutory definitions of physician practice were put in place. Id. 
at 441. 
 178. Sage, supra note 7, at 519. 
 179. The Institute of Medicine seems to agree, as they use a multi-dimensional approach to define 
―quality‖ which includes efficiency. See GOLDMAN, MCGLYNN & ALPERT, supra note 1, at 35. 
 180. Ateev Mehrotra et al., Retail Clinics, Primary Care Physicians, and Emergency 
Departments: A Comparison of Patients’ Visits, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1272, 1281 (2008). 
 181. Id. at 1280. 
 182. Reports indicate that RHC companies see this as a major consumer base for these clinics, 
with many choosing to locate RHCs in areas which are perceived as having the greatest demand—
those with significant uninsured or underinsured populations, and physician shortages. SCOTT, supra 
note 6, at 10. RHCs may also be an attractive option for individuals who are insured, but have a high-
deductible policy which leaves the individual paying for these basic kinds of clinic visits. 
 183. See Convenient Care Association Fact Sheet, supra note 9. Granted, at least part of this 
discrepancy could be due to the fact that people tend to only go see a doctor or visit the emergency 
room for more serious, and therefore more expensive to address, issues. There is evidence, however, 
that there is more substance to the cost difference than this. A study by the Convenient Care 
Association found that ―[f]orty percent or more of CCC patients report they would have gone to the 
emergency room, an urgent care center or forgone treatment altogether had there not been a CCC 
available . . . .‖ Id. This suggests that at least some RHC patients generally go to a health care entity of 
some kind for the conditions that brought them to an RHC—this may mean that a significant portion of 
patients seen by emergency rooms and physician practices were simple enough to be handled by an 
RHC. Buttressing this is a study that found that ―[t]he cost of receiving treatment for strep throat at a 
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contribute to enormous aggregate savings across the health care industry 
as a whole by facilitating a system by which basic forms of care are 
provided by lower-cost providers, as opposed to a system where patients 
turn to far more expensive sources such as emergency departments.
184
 
One criticism of RHCs, which also arguably applies to all independent 
NP practice, is that these interfere with the maintenance of a ―medical 
home‖ for each patient.185 The ―medical home‖ concept has been 
described as a ―model of health care delivery based on an ongoing 
personal relationship with a physician‖ where the physician is responsible 
for providing all care or managing the care provided by other 
professionals.
186
 The primary virtue of the medical home, according to 
proponents, is that it focuses on coordinating an individual‘s care across 
the healthcare spectrum and ensures continuity of care by having the 
personal physician take ―responsibility for appropriately arranging care 
with other qualified professionals.‖187 This criticism is not compelling for 
a number of reasons. First, no explanation has been offered as to why it 
would be more difficult for a personal physician to coordinate with an 
RHC than it would be to coordinate with any other form of health care 
 
 
CCC is less than one third of what it costs at an emergency room.‖ Id. This is consistent with the 
significantly different labor and administrative costs faced by hospitals compared to those of an RHC. 
See, e.g., EXPRESS LANE, supra note 6, at 11 (reporting that RHCs keep overhead low by operating in 
spaces with physical limitations, implying that such limitations are unique compared to most other 
practice settings); Sage, supra note 3, at 1238. 
 184. According to one study, 90.3% of RHC visits were for ten simple acute conditions and forms 
of preventive care. Mehrotra et al., supra note 180, at 1278. The study further found that those same 
ten clinical issues accounted for 18.1% of all primary care physician visits (87.76 million visits), and 
12% of all visits to emergency rooms (13.53 million visits). Id. Thus, it is possible to get an extremely 
rough idea of the potential cost savings to the overall health care market through encouraging patients 
to seek care at RHCs instead of physician offices or emergency rooms by multiplying these numbers 
by the average visit costs for each of these care sources (see supra note 9) and then subtracting from 
that number the product of these combined visit numbers and the average cost of an RHC visit. Thus, 
the calculation would look something like this: 
(87.76 million physician visits X $283per visit) + (13.53 million emergency room visits X 
$445 per visit) = $30,856,930,000 
(87.76 million + 13.53 million) X $60 per RHC visit = $6,077,400,000 
Difference = $24,779,530,000 
 185. Scott Harris, Open for Business: Health Systems Explore Retail Clinics, AAMC REP., Sept. 
2008, http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/sept08/clinics.htm (―[S]ome say the retail clinic may 
clash with the patient-centered medical home . . . .‖). 
 186. Am. Med. Student Ass‘n, Primary Care Interest Group, http://www.amsa.org/AMSA/ 
Homepage/About/ Committees/PrimaryCare.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2010); Harris, supra note 185 
(defining the medical home as ―another relatively new care model in which a single physician 
coordinates a patient‘s treatment‖). 
 187. Am. Acad. of Family Physicians et al., Joint Principles of the Patient Centered Medical 
Home, PATIENT-CENTERED PRIMARY CARE COLLABORATIVE, Feb. 2007, http://www.pcpcc.net/ 
content/joint-principles-patient-centered-medical-home. 
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entity.
188
 Absent such a rationale as to why RHCs are incompatible with 
the medical home approach, it could be argued that this proposal merely 
seeks to maintain the status quo by perpetuating physician dominance and 
control over the provision of all health care. This traditional structure has 
reached its capacity limits and therefore fails to recognize the need for 
innovative new approaches to increase the capacity of the health care 
industry.
189
 Second, it ignores the fact that a significant portion of the 
population that already is using, or is likely to use, RHCs is the portion 
that lacks a medical home to begin with.
190
 In one study, RHC patients 
reported having a primary care physician only 38.7% of the time, far 
below the national average of 80.7%.
191
 This is strong evidence that 
independent NPs might be able to provide a medical home to those who do 
not otherwise have one with a physician—thus expanding access to a form 
of the medical home instead of interfering with it.
192
   
V. CONCLUSION 
All remaining states with physician supervision and collaboration 
requirements should eliminate them and grant NPs the authority to 
practice independently. Mandatory physician involvement in NP practice 
is no longer necessary to ensure patient safety. Furthermore, as Barbara 
Safriet so astutely put it, ―[t]hese provisions are more than benignly 
redundant, however; they are also harmful and costly.‖193 Supervision and 
collaboration requirements can disrupt efficient allocation of liability in 
the malpractice system, without an offsetting gain in ensuring adequate 
compensation to malpractice victims. Independent practice by NPs also 
facilitates innovative delivery-based reforms, such as RHCs, by 
eliminating a layer of regulatory complexity and lowering the cost of NP 
utilization. Mandating that NPs maintain and operate under a formal 
 
 
 188. Julie A. Muroff, Retail Health Care: “Taking Stock” of State Responsibilities, 30 J. LEGAL 
MED. 151, 163 (2009) (―Notwithstanding the tensions associated with these trends, there is support for 
the proposition that physician practices and retail health clinics can cooperate to benefit patient care.‖).  
 189. See supra note 115 (discussing President Obama‘s recognition of the need to ―bend the . . . 
cost-curve‖ related to health care).  
 190. See Sage, supra note 7, at 514–15. 
 191. See Mehrotra et al., supra note 180, at 1276. 
 192. In drafting its set of comprehensive RHC regulations, Massachusetts demonstrated at least 
one strategy for addressing these concerns by requiring RHCs to provide patients who do not have 
primary care physicians with referrals to one, requiring RHCs to develop policies and procedures to 
identify, and possibly limit, the number of repeat encounters with individual patients, and mandating 
that RHC patients be provided with a copy of their medical records from the visit and/or that one be 
sent to the patient‘s primary care physician. 105 MASS. CODE REGS. 140.1001(E)–(G) (2009). 
 193. Safriet, supra note 63, at 451. 
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relationship with a physician places both the NP profession and RHCs in a 
tenuous position. Given the importance of exploring new means of 
delivering health care to achieve expanded access and lower costs, the 
time has come to embrace multiple categories of independent practitioners. 
While independent practice authority for NPs is ―certainly no panacea‖ for 
all of the problems weighing on the health care industry, it would certainly 
be a significant step toward opening new avenues for meaningful 
reform.
194
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